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PATENTS V. ANTITRUST:            
PREEMPTING CONFLICT 
MATTHEW G. SIPE* 
 
The dissonance between patent law and antitrust law has persisted despite a 
century of attempts at harmonization.  This Article suggests an elegant, novel 
solution:  preemption doctrine.  Recognizing the limits of and costs associated 
with antitrust law, the U.S. Supreme Court has already held that where an 
alternative regulatory authority exists—and overlapping application of antitrust 
regulation would lead to conflict—antitrust law may be implicitly preempted.  
But this doctrine remains almost entirely unexplored.  This Article applies 
preemption doctrine precedent to the patent-antitrust context, analyzing where 
patent regulatory authority exists and where simultaneous antitrust regulation 
is likely to generate conflicting guidance and requirements.  Under the Court’s 
precedent, this combination of overlap and conflict should be enough to support 
preemption, at least within certain categories of patent cases.  Moreover, this 
Article explores how the unique nature of patents and the interplay—and 
tension—that patent law alone has with antitrust law supports an even 
broader interpretation of existing preemption doctrine in this context. 
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“The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods 
they embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals.  While the antitrust 
laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward 
the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive 
exploitation of his patented art.” 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The patent-antitrust paradox has generally defied resolution.  
Attempts to either “graft antitrust doctrines onto patent law” or vice 
versa have “spawned almost a century of consternation and conflict,” 
and offered little in the way of clarity or progress.2  This conflict has long 
inspired influential writing from a number of academics in its own 
                                                     
 1. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203–04 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 2. Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust:  Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & 
TECH., Spring 2008, at 1, 2–3. 
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right.3  But the recent explosion of patent applications, grants, licenses, 
and infringement suits has made the dissonance between the two fields 
increasingly apparent—and redoubled efforts at harmonization. 
Thus far, however, the discourse on patent law and antitrust law 
has largely overlooked a particularly elegant solution, informed by 
two relatively noncontroversial axioms.  First:  where two fields of law 
are in dire conflict, preemption dictates that one may retreat.4  
Second:  antitrust law should generally be the solution of last resort to 
a given problem.5  With these principles in mind, where patent law 
offers its own solutions to potentially anticompetitive patent schemes, 
preemption may eliminate the tension that would otherwise be 
created by allowing antitrust law to simultaneously—and 
discordantly—intervene. 
In some ways, the preemption solution to the patent-antitrust 
puzzle is not novel.  The aforementioned principles have, in fact, 
already been approved and used together by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in a different context.  In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,6 
the Court relied on those principles in holding that securities law can 
preempt antitrust law.  And yet, the natural extension of this logic to 
patent law has received almost no attention.7  This Article takes up the 
                                                     
 3. See, e.g., LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW xiv, 211 (1942) 
(discussing that courts must delineate between patent and antitrust conflicts on a 
case-by-case basis to determine when the “public good is [better] served by a given 
practice”); John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust:  A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth 
and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 450–51, 465 (1997) (asserting that 
incentives for research and technological innovation must be considered when 
balancing antitrust and patent laws); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the 
Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515, 515–16, 553–54 (2015) (arguing that the 
“scope of the patent” metaphor is useful primarily in assessing conduct under patent 
law, not antitrust law); S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust:  Peaceful 
Coexistence?, 54 MICH. L. REV. 199, 200–03, 218 (1955) (concluding that “patents and 
antitrust can lead a peaceful coexistence . . . in fulfillment of the public interest”); George 
L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 309–10, 376–77 
(1977) (proposing methods to better evaluate how certain patent license agreements 
affect antitrust principles). 
 4. The essential—though not exclusive—example, of course, being where state 
and federal law conflict.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the 
supremacy of federal law over contrary state law); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1303 (2009) (discussing how 
displacement of state law by federal law has “assumed an expansive breadth” in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 7. The sole exception that this author found is Professors Kobayashi and 
Wright’s article considering how Credit Suisse might be applied in one particular type 
SIPE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2016  3:35 PM 
418 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:415 
task of that extension, analyzing the merits of preemption as applied 
to the patent-antitrust context. 
Part I of this Article describes the major criticisms and drawbacks 
of antitrust law and their recognition and incorporation into 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Part I also explains how this antitrust 
skepticism crystallized into an antitrust-specific preemption test, as 
stated in Credit Suisse :  where an alternative regulatory authority is 
exercising supervision, and simultaneously applying antitrust 
supervision would lead to conflict, antitrust law is preempted. 
Parts II, III, and IV use this test as a framework to determine the 
types of cases in which patent law logically ought to preempt antitrust 
law.  Specifically, Part II analyzes the sources of regulatory authority 
in the patent context—the Patent and Trademark Office, the 
International Trade Commission, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit—and their different spheres of authority and 
deference.  Part III uses that analysis to create a hierarchy of 
potentially anticompetitive patent activities, categorizing them based 
on the degree to which they are already under supervision from 
patent authorities.  Part IV then examines the potential for 
conflicting guidance and outcomes where antitrust supervision 
overlaps that patent supervision. 
Part V moves beyond this framework, attempting to broaden the 
analysis underpinning the Supreme Court’s antitrust-skeptical 
jurisprudence.  It introduces additional arguments in favor of 
preemption based on the unique nature of patents and the 
interplay—and tension—that patent law alone has with antitrust law.  
It argues that because the Court’s case law in this area has essentially 
elevated policy considerations into doctrinal ones, these additional 
arguments should be given significant weight moving forward. 
I. ANTITRUST SKEPTICISM AND PREEMPTION 
The profound criticisms leveled against antitrust law by academics 
should be deeply troubling to any jurist concerned with efficiency or 
fairness.  The text of the antitrust statutes is highly vague and open-
                                                     
of patent case:  patent “hold up.”  See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, 
Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust:  An Application to Patent 
Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469, 469–70 (2009).  Their analysis, however, 
exclusively covers the hold-up context and addresses a variety of potentially 
preempting areas of state and federal law.  This Article focuses solely on the potential 
for patent law to preempt antitrust law and compares that potential across all types of 
patent cases.  The professors’ insightful and novel analysis inspired some of the 
central themes found herein, for which this author is significantly indebted. 
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ended,8 leading to a common law—almost constitutional—approach 
to interpretation9 that may be fundamentally incompatible with 
antitrust law’s regulatory purpose.10  The heavy penalties for antitrust 
violations—felony convictions and treble damages11—make concerns 
over vagueness all the more pressing; the cost of false positives or 
good-faith missteps is exceptionally high.12  What’s more, the highly 
technical analysis required for antitrust adjudication makes any given 
trial time-consuming and costly.13  This technical focus tends to 
confound layperson juries,14 who are already biased against large 
                                                     
 8. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (forbidding any 
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).  Of 
course, all contracts restrain trade or commerce because they “bind[] two parties to 
each other in some fashion, thus preventing them from doing that business with 
anyone else without incurring the costs of breach.”  Matthew Sipe, Patent Privateers 
and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 223 n.174 (2016). 
 9. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 
(2007)(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-
law statute.”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)(“[T]he general 
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with 
respect to the Sherman Act.”); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 
(1936) (“We have said that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act . . . has a generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”). 
 10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
10 (2005) (“Antitrust is an economic, not a moral, enterprise.”); Daniel A. Crane, 
Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160–61, 1221 (2008) (advocating for 
greater technocracy in antitrust law and less reliance on the common-law 
adjudicatory approach). 
 11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15(a). 
 12. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 7, at 472 (acknowledging that the 
application of antitrust laws can “trigger ‘serious errors,’” and that limiting their 
enforcement can lead to “comparative advantages” from “alternative institutions . . . 
to antitrust”); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 
in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 130 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010) (recognizing 
the Supreme Court’s concern with the “high relative costs of [antitrust regulation] 
falsely condemning pro-competitive pricing behavior”). 
 13. See Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation:  Losing Academic 
Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1262, 1264–65 (2012) 
(analyzing methods to reduce the substantial time and cost associated with using 
economic expert witnesses in modern antitrust lawsuits). 
 14. See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and 
Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 52–59 (1995) (“[T]he jurors were overwhelmed, 
frustrated, and confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension. . . .  [A]t no 
time did any juror grasp—even at the margins—the law, the economics, or any other 
testimony relating to the allegations or defense.”); Crane, supra note 10, at 1183 
(“[M]odern antitrust cases consist of very few tasks that require identifying moral 
culpability, the degree of the defendant’s wrongdoing, or other matters for which 
the jury’s populist function is well suited.”). 
SIPE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2016  3:35 PM 
420 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:415 
corporations and naïve to standard business practices.15  In short, 
there is good reason to be skeptical of imbuing the antitrust laws with 
broad scope, particularly in areas where a less costly legal regime 
could be used to reach the same goals.16 
These criticisms have gained significant traction outside of purely 
academic circles, finding footholds in the courts themselves.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court has increasingly voiced serious 
skepticism towards a broadly-conceived role for antitrust law.  Since 
what might be considered the “high-water mark” of aggressive 
antitrust enforcement in the 1960s and 70s,17 the Court has expressed 
                                                     
 15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 214–15 (2d ed. 2001) (“Especially 
misleading is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag to their superiors 
about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are 
compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naïve.”); Barbara S. Swain & Dan R. 
Gallipeau, What They Bring to Court:  Juror Attitudes in Antitrust Cases, 8 ANTITRUST, 
Summer 1994, at 14, 15–17 (“In some venues, as many as 75 percent of the jurors 
think that large corporations regularly use unethical and unfair tactics to bully 
smaller competitors and squeeze them out of the marketplace.”). 
 16. Professor Jonathan Baker offers perhaps the most thorough critique of the 
antitrust-skeptical position.  See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of 
“Error Cost” Analysis:  What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).  
In particular, Professor Baker examines certain assumptions underlying antitrust 
skepticism, ranging from economic (are cartels truly self-defeating?) to institutional 
(is antitrust liability truly uncertain ex ante?).  Id. at 12–14, 30–32.  To the extent that 
Professor Baker’s arguments are persuasive regarding antitrust law generally, they are 
nevertheless not attuned to the specific context of antitrust law overlapping with 
patents—an overlap that offers significant and unique reasons to be skeptical.  See 
infra Parts IV, V (discussing the risk of conflict between the goals of patent law and 
those of antitrust enforcement). 
 17. See KY P. EWING, JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:  PRINCIPLES 
FROM AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE 128 (2d ed. 2006) (recognizing the period from the 
1960s to 1970s as one where courts demonstrated great deference to government 
actions halting corporate mergers); see also BERNICE ROTHMAN HASIN, CONSUMERS, 
COMMISSIONS, AND CONGRESS:  LAW, THEORY, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
1968–1985, at 48 (1987) (describing court rulings that stopped corporate mergers as 
furthering the “judicial goal of small business protection” due to a “fear of economic 
concentration”); Dennis A. Yao, Commissioner, FTC, Prepared Remarks Before the 
Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association, Challenges in Merger 
Analysis:  The 1992 Merger Guidelines and Beyond 1–4 (Dec. 2, 1992), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/694541/19921202
_yao_challenges_in_merger_analysis-_the_1992_merger_guidelines_and_beyond.pdf 
(stating that in previous years, only about two percent of pre-merger filings “required 
in-depth investigation” while the vast majority were allowed to proceed, in stark 
contrast to mergers halted by the Court in the 1960s and 70s).  Ewing, Hasin, and 
Yao were all referring largely to the Court’s holding in United States v. Von’s Grocery 
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), which prohibited the merger of two grocery stores that had 
only single-digit market share when combined. 
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greater and greater cynicism about the efficiency and efficacy of 
antitrust law in practice. 
For example, in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,18 the Court held that 
the per se rule against group boycotts did not apply to a single 
“buyer’s decision to buy from one seller rather than another.”19  
While its holding rested “in large part upon precedent,” the Court 
noted as additional support that other legal regimes—including 
“‘unfair competition’ laws, business tort laws, or regulatory laws”—
could provide remedies in unilateral supplier-switching cases instead 
of antitrust law.20  Moreover, the Court reasoned, those alternative 
regimes would be less likely to chill competitors from changing 
suppliers for legitimate business purposes.21 
This idea of antitrust law as a blunt instrument of last resort was 
expanded further in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP.22  In Trinko, a class of local telephone service providers 
alleged that Verizon had failed to fulfill its obligation to share access 
to its telephone network and support systems as required by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA).23  The class argued that this 
failure was part of an anticompetitive scheme to harm local providers, 
constituting a violation of the Sherman Act in addition to the TCA.24  
The Court disagreed, determining that “pre-existing antitrust 
standards” did not prohibit Verizon’s conduct, and that an expansion 
of antitrust law to create such a prohibition was not warranted.25  
Despite the TCA having an antitrust-specific savings clause,26 the 
Court’s reluctance to expand antitrust law was largely predicated on 
the fact that the TCA existed as an alternative to police Verizon’s 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct.27  That is, even though the TCA by 
its own terms did not modify, impair, or supersede the antitrust laws, 
the Court nevertheless determined that its existence made antitrust 
intervention unnecessary, and the Court supported a narrow view of 
antitrust law in the telecommunications sphere, generally: 
                                                     
 18. 525 U.S. 128 (1998). 
 19. Id. at 130. 
 20. Id. at 135, 137. 
 21. See id. at 136–37. 
 22. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 404–05; see 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2), (3) (2012). 
 24. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 404–05. 
 25. Id. at 407–08, 410–11. 
 26. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (“[N]othing in this Act . . . or the amendments made 
by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any 
of the antitrust laws.”). 
 27. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411–14. 
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One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory 
structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm.  Where 
such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided 
by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less 
plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.  
Where, by contrast, “[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory 
scheme which performs the antitrust function,” the benefits of 
antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.28 
The Court’s analysis was accompanied by a “realistic assessment” of 
the considerable disadvantages noted at the outset of this Part, 
including the high cost of “false positives,” the potential to “chill” 
legitimate conduct, and the “highly technical” analysis required.29 
Only three years later, the Supreme Court would crystallize this 
skepticism and concern into a more concrete form:  antitrust 
preemption doctrine.  In Credit Suisse, a group of investors alleged that 
a group of investment banks acting as underwriters had violated 
antitrust laws when they created syndicates to assist in executing initial 
public offerings for several hundred companies.30  In particular, the 
investors claimed that the banks had agreed amongst themselves to 
only sell newly issued securities to buyers if the buyers agreed to certain 
terms, including a commitment to purchase additional shares later at a 
higher price.31  The Court noted that, unlike in Trinko, the securities 
laws contained neither a savings clause nor a preemption clause, 
leaving only the possibility of implicit preemption.32 
Determining that the key question was whether antitrust and 
securities law are “clearly incompatible,”33 the Court set forth four 
factors to consider: 
(1) [T]he existence of regulatory authority under the securities law 
to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the 
responsible regulatory entities exercise that authority; and (3) a 
resulting risk that the securities and antitrust laws, if both 
applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, 
duties, privileges, or standards of conduct.  We also note (4) that in 
[prior cases] the possible conflict affected practices that lie 
                                                     
 28. Id. at 412 (citation omitted) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 
358 (1963)). 
 29. Id. at 414. 
 30. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 269 (2007). 
 31. Id. at 269–70. 
 32. Id. at 270–71 (“Where regulatory statutes are silent in respect to antitrust . . . 
courts must determine whether, and in what respects, they implicitly preclude 
application of the antitrust laws.”). 
 33. Id. at 275. 
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squarely within an area of financial market activity that the 
securities law seeks to regulate.34 
The Court found that all four factors counseled in favor of 
incompatibility, holding that the securities laws had implicitly 
preempted the antitrust laws in that context—“efforts jointly to 
promote and to sell newly issued securities”—and rejecting the 
investors’ antitrust claims as a result.35 
The Court devoted most of its attention in Credit Suisse to the third 
factor:  whether the securities and antitrust laws, when both are 
applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, 
duties, privileges, or standards of conduct.  Noting the “fine, 
complex, detailed line” separating activity the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) permits and activity the SEC forbids,36 
the “need for securities-related expertise” in adjudication, the 
“contradictory inferences” that antitrust law and securities law draw, 
and the “risk of inconsistent court results,” the Court determined that 
“antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes” where 
they intervene with securities law.37  The Court coupled this analysis 
with a reiteration of the arguments in Trinko and the discussion 
above, including the high cost of false positives with antitrust law and 
the accompanying “chilling effect,” as well as the “unusually small” 
need for antitrust intervention where an alternative regulatory 
framework operates.38  Discussing the different procedural 
requirements for antitrust and securities lawsuits, the Court also 
highlighted the risk of “permitting plaintiffs to dress what is 
essentially a securities complaint in antitrust clothing” to avoid 
securities procedures.39 
The Court has not since revisited its analysis in Credit Suisse or 
provided further examples of what fields of law might be clearly 
incompatible with—and, hence, preempt—antitrust law.40  With 
                                                     
 34. Id. at 275–76. 
 35. Id. at 276, 285. 
 36. Id. at 279. 
 37. Id. at 281–82. 
 38. Id. at 283. 
 39. Id. at 284. 
 40. Nor have any lower courts addressed the relationship between patent laws 
and antitrust laws under the Credit Suisse preemption framework.  Lower courts have, 
however, applied the Credit Suisse test to preempt antitrust law in other cases.  See, e.g., 
Elec. Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 588 F.3d 128, 133, 137–38 (2d Cir. 
2009) (holding that securities regulations regarding certain short-selling practices 
had preempted the antitrust laws); Horisons Unlimited v. Santa Cruz-Monterey-
Merced Managed Med. Care Comm’n, No. 1:14-CV-00123-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 
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Credit Suisse in mind, however, the prima facie case for patent law 
preempting antitrust law is strong.  Even the most basic activity 
permitted by a patent—excluding and eliminating direct 
competition—would attract antitrust scrutiny in any other context.  
The same cannot be said for the mere buying and selling of securities.  
This does not simply suggest that patent law and antitrust law have a 
unique tension between them—although that alone does indicate that 
permitting the two to overlap will likely produce dissonant results.  
Rather, it suggests that the basic elements of patent law must exist as a 
carve-out or exception to antitrust law to begin with.  Merely extending 
that carve-out to encompass more complex patent activities through 
preemption is, therefore, in some ways a smaller and more 
straightforward step than the one the Court made in Credit Suisse. 
Although the prima facie case for preemption is thus reasonably 
clear, it is worth noting that in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,41 the Court’s most 
recent examination of overlapping patent law and antitrust law, there 
is no mention of Credit Suisse or preemption.  Actavis concerned the 
practice of so-called reverse-payment settlements:  the owner of a drug 
patent, rather than risk a finding of non-infringement or invalidity at 
trial, simply pays the creator of a generic substitute to not bring its 
drug to market.42  The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s 
conclusion that “a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is 
‘immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall 
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent,’” holding 
that dismissal of the FTC’s complaint was therefore improper.43  One 
might plausibly extrapolate from the opinion that a marriage of equals 
between patent law and antitrust law is forthcoming or that the 
opinion signals a trend away from antitrust skepticism generally.  This 
Article, however, argues that Actavis is actually in harmony with Credit 
Suisse and guided at least in part by the same principles.  Specifically, 
applying the four-factor test in Credit Suisse in the patent law context, 
this Article finds that reverse-payment settlements fit perfectly into the 
subcategory of patent activities that would not preempt antitrust law, 
                                                     
3342565, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2014) (holding that Medicaid regulations regarding 
managed care plans preempted the antitrust laws).  But see In re Wellbutrin XL 
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08-2431 (direct), 08-2433 (indirect), 2012 WL 1657734, at *29–
30 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (rejecting the argument that FDA regulations had 
preempted the antitrust laws in pharmaceutical conspiracy cases). 
 41. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 42. Id. at 2227. 
 43. Id. (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1289, 1312 (2012), rev’d, 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. 
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anyway.44  That is, on the merits, reverse-payment settlements—and, 
likewise, the holding in Actavis—constitute one of a handful of built-in 
exceptions to Credit Suisse rather than a negation of the rule.  This 
synchronicity suggests that a close re-examination of Credit Suisse and 
its guiding principles may provide insight or predictive power as to 
how the Court will strike a balance between the two spheres moving 
forward:  whether or not the Court explicitly invokes Credit Suisse or 
preemption in such cases.45 
With that payoff in mind, the next three Parts use Credit Suisse’s 
four-factor test as a basic framework to engage with its analytical 
structure on its own terms, thereby creating a taxonomy of patent 
activities according to preemption potential.  Specifically, Parts II and III 
answer the questions posed by the first, second, and fourth prongs of the 
Credit Suisse test:  Where does regulatory authority exist in the patent 
sphere and what kinds of activities does that authority supervise?46  Part 
IV is devoted to answering the question posed by the third prong, which 
occupied most of the Court’s attention in Credit Suisse :  How severe is the 
risk that overlapping patent and antitrust authority will lead to conflict?47  
After engaging directly with the Court’s test, Part V broadens the analysis 
by introducing additional arguments in favor of preemption for which 
Credit Suisse and its doctrinal predecessors, such as NYNEX and Trinko, 
appear to pave the way. 
II. THE SOURCES OF PATENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
The first two prongs of the Credit Suisse test ask whether regulatory 
authority exists to “supervise the activities in question,” and whether 
“the responsible regulatory entities” actually exercise their authority 
in practice.48  The fourth prong asks the similar question of whether 
the activities in question lie “squarely within an area” that the 
preempting law “seeks to regulate.”49  Where regulatory authority 
already exists and supervises conduct, the need for antitrust 
                                                     
 44. See infra Section III.C. 
 45. In the alternative, if Actavis does signal a more fundamental regime change 
moving forward, this Article provides an instrument to measure precisely how the 
Court’s position shifts.  In other words, whether the Court is becoming more 
confident in antitrust law across contexts, becoming more skeptical of patent law 
across contexts, or adjusting the balance only where the two genuinely overlap and 
conflict may be determined by how the Court departs from the conclusions herein. 
 46. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275–76 (2007). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 276. 
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intervention is reduced and weighs in favor of preemption.50  This 
Part offers broad answers to the initial questions posed by the first, 
second, and fourth prongs, outlining the sources of regulatory 
authority over patents and their general scope. 
Of course, the Credit Suisse test is activity-specific,51 and the 
argument that patent law features a sufficiently robust regulatory 
apparatus to preempt antitrust law will not be equally persuasive for 
all types of patent activity.  This variation in patent regulatory 
potential is explored in greater detail in Part III, which creates a 
rough taxonomy of potentially anticompetitive patent activities and 
the degree to which they are already under supervision.  This Part 
lays the groundwork for that analysis by first answering the 
surprisingly complex question of where and in what form patent 
regulatory authority exists at all. 
Regulatory authority within the patent world stems primarily from 
three remarkably different sources:  (1) the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), (2) the International Trade Commission (ITC), and 
(3) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The PTO is an 
agency only recently coming into its full strength, thanks to a 
legislative overhaul.  The ITC is an agency with considerable 
longstanding authority but more limited policy levers.  And the 
Federal Circuit, using its unique position within the Article III 
judiciary to act as a de facto agency, has filled much of the 
unoccupied regulatory space between the two.52 
A. The Patent and Trademark Office:  An Agency on the Rise 
Historically, the PTO has suffered from a surprising dearth of 
administrative authority.  Upon its creation, the Patent Office was 
afforded seemingly broad powers: 
[T]here shall be established . . . an office to be denominated the 
Patent Office . . . whose duty it shall be . . . to superintend, execute, 
and perform, all such acts and things touching and respecting the 
granting and issuing of patents for new and useful discoveries, 
                                                     
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. (acknowledging that the underwriters’ activities were “central to the 
proper functioning of well-regulated capital markets”). 
 52. See infra notes 94–96 (explaining that the Federal Court Improvement Act 
established the Federal Circuit to have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over 
patent law cases). 
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inventions, and improvements, as are herein provided for, or shall 
hereafter be, by law, directed to be done and performed . . . .53 
This authority was expanded in the Patent Act of 1952, which 
granted the PTO the power to “prescribe regulations governing the 
recognition and conduct of . . . parties before the Patent Office.”54  
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit interpreted these grants narrowly, 
rejecting the proposition that the PTO had the authority to receive 
Chevron deference for any substantive, rather than merely procedural, 
rules.55  This lack of deference led to the perception of the PTO as a 
relatively “weak agency.”56 
However, developments within the past five years have opened the 
door to a much more robust and broad regulatory role for the PTO, 
which the PTO has already begun to embrace.  First and foremost, the 
2011 passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)57 has, in 
                                                     
 53. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117–18.  Prior to that point, 
patent applications were examined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, 
and the Attorney General.  See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10. 
 54. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, §§ 6, 31, 66 Stat. 792, 793, 795 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012)), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
 55. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that when a federal agency charged with enforcing a statute interprets 
ambiguous provisions within that statute, courts should apply a very high level of 
deference to that interpretation.  467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  The Federal Circuit has 
generally held that this level of deference does not apply to the PTO’s substantive 
interpretations of the patent laws.  See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac 
Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The PTO lacks substantive 
rulemaking authority.”); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers . . . does NOT grant the 
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.”); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The authority granted [to the PTO] is 
directed to the ‘conduct of proceedings’ before the Office.  A substantive declaration 
with regard to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the patent statutes . . . does not 
fall within the usual interpretation of such statutory language.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch:  Ex Ante 
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238–39 (2012) (recognizing 
that prior to the passage of the AIA, the patent debate focused on Federal Circuit 
decisions, not the PTO, which lacked any substantive rulemaking power); Samiyyah 
R. Ali, Note, The Great Balancing Act:  The Effect of the America Invents Act on the Division 
of Power Between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
217, 222–23 (2016) (finding that the lack of both a congressional delegation and 
Federal Circuit deference to the PTO created the perception of a “weak 
administrative agency”). 
 57. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
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the eyes of then-Director of the PTO, David Kappos, provided “the 
most significant overhaul to our patent system[] since the founding 
fathers.”58  This overhaul includes new adjudicative, standard-setting, 
and policymaking powers for the PTO.59  Next, even outside of the AIA 
context, courts have begun to increasingly recognize that the PTO is 
entitled to deference on substantive matters.  These shifts signal a 
significant increase in regulatory power for the PTO moving forward, 
and they implicate Credit Suisse’s antitrust preemption analysis. 
Turning first to the AIA, by granting the PTO increased control 
through new adjudicative proceedings and a broadly-defined 
prioritization power, the AIA “appears to vest the [PTO] with 
substantive rulemaking authority.”60  In terms of new proceedings, 
the AIA has created post-grant review61 and inter partes review,62 
wherein third parties may challenge the validity of a recently issued 
patent; derivation proceedings, wherein multiple parties contest 
ownership of a single invention;63 and supplemental examinations, 
wherein a patent owner may seek to correct errors made during 
prosecution.64  These adjudicative proceedings are formal and “trial-
like”65—including pretrial discovery, witness testimony with cross-
examination, rules of evidence, and oral arguments66—which weighs 
considerably in favor of granting the PTO Chevron deference for 
regulations or rulings resulting from these proceedings.67  Moreover, 
                                                     
 58. David Kappos, Re-Inventing the US Patent System, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/re_inventing_the_us_patent. 
 59. 125 Stat. at 313, 329–33. 
 60. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 626 (2012). 
 61. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012). 
 62. Id. § 311. 
 63. See id. §§ 135, 146, 291. 
 64. See id. § 257(a). 
 65. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:  Chevron Deference 
for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1983 (2013) (observing that the AIA’s 
legislative history reveals Congress’s intent to establish a formal adjudication 
process); see also Tran, supra note 60, at 631 (noting that the AIA “give[s] the USPTO 
broad control over its new trial-like proceedings”). 
 66. See USPTO Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,761, 48,768 (Aug. 
14, 2012). 
 67. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“We have recognized 
a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express 
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication 
that produces regulations or rulings . . . .”); see also Rai, supra note 56, at 1280 (“In 
fact, the executive branch could also use the postgrant-review authority conferred 
upon the PTO by the AIA to go one step further.  As a doctrinal matter, under 
current Supreme Court precedent, . . . the government could ask for Chevron 
deference toward decisions made in postgrant review proceedings.”); Wasserman, 
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the AIA explicitly grants the PTO rulemaking powers over these new 
procedures—rulemaking that encompasses not only “procedures” but 
also clearly substantive “standards.”68  By setting the standard for what 
constitutes “derivation,” for example, the PTO can control “whether 
some inventions are patentable” at all.69 
On top of all of this, the AIA has created a new prioritization 
power, granting the PTO the ability to fast-track inventions based 
solely on policy considerations.70  By enabling the PTO to “set 
standards that affect core patent rights” and rank the relative 
importance of patent applications for policy reasons, the AIA has 
defined the PTO’s role in shaping patent law and enhanced its role 
beyond mere patent application review.71 
Turning next to the courts, case law has begun to bolster the 
general level of deference afforded to the PTO for interpretations of 
patent laws.  While the PTO still lacks Chevron deference for its 
                                                     
supra note 65, at 1989 (“[I]f a court determines that Congress intended the postgrant 
review proceedings to be effectuated through formal adjudication, the PTO’s 
interpretation of ambiguous terms of the Patent Act announced during postgrant 
review proceedings should be entitled to Chevron deference.”).  To wit, the Federal 
Circuit has recognized Chevron deference for the ITC’s section 337 determinations 
for exactly this reason.  See, e.g., Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that because the ITC’s “investigations under Section 
337 require adequate notice, cross-examination, presentation of evidence, objection, 
motion, argument, and all other rights” associated with a trial-like hearing, Chevron 
deference applies).  See generally infra text accompanying notes 83–85 (reviewing the 
difference in levels of deference courts apply to the ITC’s section 337 interpretations 
versus its Patent Act interpretations). 
 68. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (granting the PTO authority to set forth 
“standards” of “sufficient evidence to prove and rebut a claim of derivation”); id. § 
316(a)(2) (granting the PTO authority to set forth “the standards for the showing of 
sufficient grounds to institute” inter partes review); id. § 362(a)(2) (granting the 
PTO authority to set forth “the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to 
institute” post-grant review); id. § 316(a)(5) (granting the PTO authority to set forth 
the “standards” for “necessary . . . discovery”); id. § 316(a)(9) (granting the PTO 
authority to set forth “standards” for when amending a patent is proper).  Courts 
generally recognize “standard-setting” as a form of substantive rulemaking.  See, e.g., 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–77 (2001); JEM Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 69. Tran, supra note 60, at 644. 
 70. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(G) (“[The PTO] may, subject to any conditions 
prescribed by the Director and at the request of the patent applicant, provide for 
prioritization of examination of applications for products, processes, or technologies 
that are important to the national economy or national competitiveness . . . .”). 
 71. Tran, supra note 60, at 640. 
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interpretations of the Patent Act,72 its entitlement to the lesser 
Skidmore deference73 has become increasingly accepted.74  The 
difference between the two may be more academic than practical; a 
comprehensive empirical study by Professors Kristin Hickman and 
Matthew Kreuger found that federal courts of appeals applying 
Skidmore are “highly deferential,” with outcomes “weighted heavily in 
favor of government agencies.”75  Even where courts have not 
explicitly invoked a standard of deference, core PTO interpretations 
have been gaining traction, causing “substantial legal effect” and, in 
some cases, being adopted wholesale.76 
                                                     
 72. In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court did extend 
Chevron deference to the PTO’s interpretations of certain statutes relating to inter 
partes review.  136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016); see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) 
(making “final and nonappealable” the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) 
decision to institute an IPR petition).  However, the PTO’s interpretations of 
statutory patentability requirements—i.e., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103—still do not receive 
such deference. 
 73. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court held that even when an 
agency’s rulings and interpretations lack the authority to control in the courts, 
certain agency judgments—those that demonstrate thorough consideration, valid 
reasoning, and consistency with previous pronouncements—may have the “power to 
persuade.”  323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  This has generally been considered a basis for 
agency deference independent from (and “weaker” to) Chevron deference.  See, e.g., 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); see also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:  
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1105, 1125–27 (2001). 
 74. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
689 F.3d 1303, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e owe deference [to the PTO] only 
commensurate with ‘the thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its 
reasoning.’” (quoting Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996))), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Univ. of Mass. v. Kappos, 903 F. Supp. 2d 77, 
84 (D.D.C. 2012)(“[T]he PTO’s determination is not entitled to Chevron deference 
[but is] entitled to deference under Skidmore.”).  But see Photocure ASA v. Kappos, 
603 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (denying the PTO Skidmore deference for its 
interpretation of patent-term extensions because of previously inconsistent 
interpretations by the PTO). 
 75. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (2007) (emphasis added); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099 
(2008) (finding that agency win rates under Chevron and Skidmore standards from 
1983 to 2005 were 76.2% and 73.5%, respectively). 
 76. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1041, 1110 (2011) (highlighting the acceptance and adoption of the PTO’s 
utility and written-description guidelines into Federal Circuit case law); Rai, supra 
note 56, at 1255 (same).  For examples of this adoption, see Ariad Pharmaceuticals, 
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In short, the AIA expanded the PTO’s substantive rulemaking 
power considerably, and—even where it failed to do so—the PTO has 
already “demonstrated an ability to use rulemaking” to “steer 
substantive patent law’s development in important ways.”77  
Combined, these increases in authorized and utilized regulatory 
control support a narrowing role for antitrust law in the patent world 
under the preemption analysis of Credit Suisse. 
B. The International Trade Commission:  Longstanding Regulatory 
Authority 
In comparison to the relatively weak historical power of the PTO, 
the ITC has long wielded considerable administrative power.  Under 
section 337 of the Tariff Act,78 the ITC has the authority to investigate 
and rule on “[u]nfair methods of competition,” including “[t]he 
importation into the United States . . . of articles that . . . infringe a 
valid and enforceable United States patent.”79  In terms of remedies, 
the ITC has a relatively unique form of injunctive relief at its disposal:  
the exclusion order.80  These orders block importation of the 
                                                     
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“If the law of 
written description is to be changed, contrary to sound policy and the uniform 
holdings of this court . . . and PTO practice, such a decision would require good 
reason and would rest with Congress.”); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (finding the PTO’s utility standards to be consistent with the court’s 
understanding of the statutory requirement); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 
F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the PTO’s standard for evaluating 
compliance with written description requirements). 
 77. John M. Golden, The USPTO’s Soft Power:  Who Needs Chevron Deference?, 66 
SMU L. REV. 541, 551 (2013). 
 78. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 
U.S.C. § 1337). 
 79. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 80. § 1337(d)(2); see, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 
1095, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  In practice, once infringement is found, an exclusion 
order is almost always granted.  See Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1557 n.45 (2011) (“There have only been three cases since 1974 
where the ITC has found an imported good to infringe a valid patent, but declined 
to issue an exclusion order . . . .”).  This is in large part because the ITC’s exclusion 
power is granted by statute rather than traditional principles of equity such that the 
typical (and difficult to satisfy) four-part test for a permanent injunction is not used.  
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting that a plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction in equity must show:  “(1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”). 
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infringing product, including downstream-implementing products.81  
Along similar lines, the ITC may issue cease and desist orders to 
direct a company within the United States to “cease its unfair acts, 
including selling infringing imported articles out of U.S. inventory.”82 
The courts have already determined that the ITC receives Chevron 
deference in interpreting section 337.83  This allows the ITC 
considerable power over not only its own internal procedures but also 
in setting standards for what constitutes, for example, “[u]nfair 
methods of competition . . . in the importation of articles.”84  Such an 
interpretation might reasonably include certain patent activity short 
of or distinct from infringement that nevertheless implicates 
competitive equilibria. 
While the overwhelming majority of section 337 actions require 
adjudicating claims of patent infringement—and, therefore, defenses 
to infringement85—the ITC does not currently receive Chevron 
deference for its interpretations of the Patent Act itself.86  Moving 
forward, however, that deference may emerge indirectly.  The 
language “valid and enforceable United States patent” is used in 
section 337, but neither “valid” nor “enforceable” is defined 
elsewhere in the statute.87  “Valid” is used in varying contexts 
throughout the Tariff Act,88 and “enforceable” has “no common 
                                                     
 81. See, e.g., Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 
1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming the ITC’s issuance of a limited exclusion order 
against downstream devices that contained infringing memory devices), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. Intel Corp., 946 F.2d 821 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 82. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:  ANSWERS TO 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 24 (2009), https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_propert 
y/documents/337_faqs.pdf. 
 83. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1290 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (granting Chevron deference to the ITC’s interpretations of section 337 
by acknowledging that the ITC has authority to resolve the ambiguity in section 337). 
 84. § 1337(a)(1)(A). 
 85. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 80, at 1554 n.27 (“In the 2009 fiscal year, for 
example, seventy-nine of the eighty-five active section 337 investigations included a 
patent infringement claim.”). 
 86. Id. at 1562.  Nor does the ITC appear to receive such deference implicitly.  
See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization:  An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade 
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1719–20 (2009) (“The reversal rates for the 
ITC appear roughly in line with the reversal rates for patent-busy district courts.”). 
 87. § 1337(a). 
 88. See, e.g., § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(C) (using the term “valid” in reference to 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks interchangeably). 
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definition” in patent law.89  Unlike the sections of the Tariff Act 
governing copyright and trademark issues—which directly reference 
both the Copyright and Trademark Acts90—the Tariff Act does not 
directly reference the Patent Act.  This ambiguity in the text—and 
lack of tethering to the Patent Act, which the ITC does not 
administer91—opens the door for Chevron deference to the ITC’s 
determinations of what constitutes patent validity and enforceability 
in its formal section 337 adjudications.92 
The longstanding administrative authority and deference afforded 
to the ITC, in addition to its potential for deference on matters of 
patent validity and enforceability, suggests minimizing the role for 
antitrust law where patents are involved under the Credit Suisse 
framework.  This is bolstered further by the PTO’s more direct 
administrative role over the Patent Act, including its recently 
enhanced regulatory powers and authority.93  A third key player in 
the patent realm, the Federal Circuit, makes the need for outside 
interference of antitrust law even more suspect. 
C. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Court as Agency 
The Federal Circuit is the odd duck of Article III courts.  It is the 
only federal court of appeals with jurisdiction solely defined by 
subject matter rather than geography.94  Moreover, it is unique in that 
it exercises near-exclusive dominion over its subject matter; most 
cases that end up before the Federal Circuit could not have properly 
ended up before any other intermediate court of appeals.95  Similarly, 
                                                     
 89. Kumar, supra note 80, at 1577 (“Although the Federal Circuit has found a 
patent to be unenforceable in certain circumstances, such as in cases of inequitable 
conduct, there is no common definition for the term.” (footnote omitted)). 
 90. See § 1337 (a)(1)(B)(i) (“[C]opyright registered under title 17 . . . .”); § 1337 
(a)(1)(C) (“[T]rademark registered under the Trademark Act of 1946 . . . .”). 
 91. Corning Glass Works v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 n.5 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he [ITC] is not charged with administration of the patent 
statute . . . .”). 
 92. Kumar, supra note 80, at 1568–75.  As noted supra note 67, under Mead, 
where an agency engages in formal adjudication, interpretations of the statute that 
the agency “administers” are afforded Chevron deference.  United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001).  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 
92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006). 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 94. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (defining the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction 
in terms of subject matter), with 28 U.S.C. § 41 (defining the regional circuits’ 
geographic jurisdictions). 
 95. § 1295(a) (detailing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction); see also Hon. 
Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Keynote 
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it is the only federal court of appeals other than the Supreme Court 
with national jurisdiction, taking appeals from all ninety-four federal 
district courts.96  This idiosyncratic position that the Federal Circuit 
occupies—national and exclusive control of, among other things, 
patent appeals—has enabled it to perform a likewise idiosyncratic 
role:  court as agency.  By engaging in quasi-agency functions, the 
Federal Circuit further contributes to the preemption of antitrust law 
under the analysis of Credit Suisse. 
These quirks of the Federal Circuit are a feature, not a bug; unlike 
the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit was the product of specific, 
articulated policy goals.  In the late 1970s, a presidential policy review 
concluded that “disuniform patent law” had become an “impediment 
to continued American dominance of the technology industry.”97  
That disuniformity spurred “widespread” patent forum shopping as 
litigants vied to have their cases heard in circuits considered 
significantly more or less friendly to patent rights.98  Meanwhile, the 
federal courts of appeals were faced with “exploding caseloads,”99 a 
burden that nearly quadrupled from 1960 to 1973.100  Professor 
Daniel Meador envisioned a singular solution to these twin problems:  
                                                     
Address at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review:  Is It Time to Abolish the 
Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases? (Sept. 26, 2013), in 13 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 1 (2013), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewco 
ntent.cgi?article=11396&context=journal_articles (stating that the Federal Circuit 
has “exclusive jurisdiction over three types of appeals in patent cases:  (1) appeals 
from district courts in cases ‘arising under’ the patent; (2) appeals from decisions of 
the [PTO’s] Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; and (3) appeals from 
investigations of the [ITC] into the importation of goods that allegedly infringe a 
U.S. patent”).  But see Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–
09 (1988) (holding that cases involving only patent law defenses do not fall under the 
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction). 
 96. Elizabeth I. Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 813, 815–
18 (2011). 
 97. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 
1454 (2012) (citing COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., 
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 
195, 369–71 (1975)). 
 98. COMM’N ON REVISION, supra note 97, at 220; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court 
Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 647 (2015) (“Patent holders 
tended to prefer to file their cases in a district court within the Fifth, Sixth, or 
Seventh Circuit . . . .  Defendants usually preferred to litigate in the Eighth or Ninth 
Circuit . . . .”). 
 99. Gugliuzza, supra note 97, at 1454–55. 
 100. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 72–73 
tbl.3.6 (1996). 
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the creation of a national patent appeals court.101  His vision and 
efforts as head of the Office for Improvements in the Administration 
of Justice102 would eventually lead to the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982 (“FCIA”),103 creating the Federal Circuit: 
Directing patent appeals to the new court will have the beneficial 
effect of removing these unusually complex, technically difficult, 
and time-consuming cases from the dockets of the regional courts 
of appeals. . . .  [T]he central purpose is to reduce the widespread 
lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the 
administration of patent law.104 
In practice, the Federal Circuit has taken the intention of its 
creation—uniformity and expertise in patent law—as well as its 
unique position in the judiciary, and translated it into two key 
practices that resemble those of an agency:  rulemaking and non-
deferential review.  First, in terms of rulemaking, the Federal Circuit 
has behaved similar to an agency by issuing mandatory, bright-line 
rules via case law.  The early history of the Federal Circuit in particular 
is replete with examples of such bright-line rules.  The presumption of 
entitlement to injunctive relief for infringement105 and the mandatory 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for obviousness106 offer two 
familiar examples.  While the Supreme Court strongly encouraged this 
quasi-agency rulemaking role early on,107 that trend has changed in 
                                                     
 101. Gugliuzza, supra note 97, at 1455. 
 102. Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit:  A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. 
REV. 581, 582 & nn.4–7 (1992). 
 103. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; see, 
e.g., 127 CONG. REC. 27,792 (1981) (statement of Rep. McClory) (“[W]e heard a great 
deal of testimony concerning the problem of forum-shopping which presently is 
practiced in many different district courts around the country.”). 
 104. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22–23 (1981) (reporting on the FCIA). 
 105. See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(asserting that “[a] court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers,” and 
deciding “that where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly 
established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed”), abrogated by Robert Bosch 
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 106. See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (citing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976))(“Obviousness cannot be 
established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed 
invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination.  Under 
section 103, teachings or references can be combined only if there is some suggestion 
or incentive to do so.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998); Isabelle R. 
McAndrews, The On-Sale Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics:  Toward a Bright-Line Rule, 
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 155, 160 (1999) (“The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari [in Pfaff] to develop a ‘bright-line rule’ regarding what type of 
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recent years.108  Despite this pushback, the Federal Circuit retains 
considerable rulemaking potential,109 whether through “process-based 
formalism”110 or the mechanism of en banc review: 
The number and breadth of questions the Federal Circuit agrees to 
hear en banc and the means by which it hears them go beyond the 
limited role of a court—to decide the case before it.  Instead of 
exercising restraint and addressing only what it must, the Federal 
Circuit raises wide-ranging questions and makes broad 
pronouncements of law that set or change patent policy. 
 . . . Despite being an appellate court not subject to the notice 
and comment requirements [of administrative agencies], the 
Federal Circuit appears to comply with these requirements when it 
orders cases to be heard en banc.111 
Second, the Federal Circuit has engaged in non-deferential, 
agency-like review of PTO and ITC cases.  The low standards of 
review afforded the PTO and ITC closely resemble “the non-deferential 
approach taken by the top level of an agency reviewing an administrative 
law judge more than a federal court reviewing an executive branch 
agency.”112  This stands in stark contrast to the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of non-patent agencies, which typically receive considerable 
deference.113  By offering very limited deference to the patent agencies 
                                                     
commercial activity would constitute placing an invention ‘on sale’ under 35 U.S.C. 
102(b).”). 
 108. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 427 (2007) 
(characterizing the Federal Circuit’s “Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation” rule as “too 
constrained to serve its purpose”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 
(2006) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s “general rule . . . [of] issu[ing] permanent 
injunctions against patent infringement”); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. 
L. REV. 229, 253 (2013) (summarizing Supreme Court case law demonstrating a 
backlash against the Federal Circuit’s “rigid reliance” on obligatory tests). 
 109. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 108, at 253 (“The Court has not expressed 
concern over the Federal Circuit’s creating tests to help clarify ambiguities in the 
Patent Act . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 110. Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 126–27, 129 (2005).  Analyzing the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence, Professor Holbrook contrasts “[s]ubstantively formalistic rules,” 
which the Supreme Court is more likely to limit, with “procedurally formalistic” rules, 
which the Supreme Court has generally upheld.  Id. at 125–26 (emphasis added). 
 111. Ryan Vacca, Acting like an Administrative Agency:  The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 
MO. L. REV. 733, 733–34 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 112. Kumar, supra note 108, at 258; see also Tran, supra note 60, at 616 (“[The 
Federal Circuit] has assumed exclusive responsibility for making substantive 
interpretations of the Patent Act . . . .”). 
 113. See, e.g., Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(granting Chevron deference to the Treasury’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue 
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below, the Federal Circuit has thus entered a policymaking space, 
effectively treating the PTO and ITC as the court’s alter ego. 
Much like the Federal Circuit’s practice of creating bright-line 
rules, its lack of deference to the PTO and ITC has received some 
pushback, as noted in Sections II.A and II.B.  But even if these critiques of 
the Federal Circuit as a quasi-agency win out, with an aggressive tamping 
down on rulemaking or non-deferential review, the PTO and ITC’s 
regulatory authority would almost certainly grow to fill the void.114 
In other words, future changes to the patent regulatory apparatus 
are likely to be hydraulic shifts in authority between the PTO, ITC, 
and Federal Circuit, if not outright expansions.  And the aggregate 
amount of regulatory authority afforded these three entities is already 
quite significant in scope and scale.  Taken together, the authority 
ought to be enough to implicate Credit Suisse’s preemption test in at 
least some types of cases.115  The following Part takes up the task of 
determining precisely which types. 
                                                     
Code); Patterson v. Dep’t of the Interior, 424 F.3d 1151, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(granting Chevron deference to the Office of Personnel Management); Tunik v. Merit 
Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (granting Chevron deference to 
the Merit Systems Protection Board); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document 
Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Lanham 
Act to warrant Chevron deference for the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board). 
 114. Indeed, as some scholars have observed, the Federal Circuit’s longstanding 
agency-like intervention can be traced to Congress’s failure to instill sufficiently 
broad and deep regulatory authority in the PTO and ITC to begin with.  In other 
words, a robust regulatory structure governing patents is so fundamentally necessary 
as to essentially be inevitable.  See, e.g., Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent 
Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961, 963, 965–66 (2014) (suggesting that 
the Federal Circuit has constantly expanded its influence in patents in spite of the 
growth of, among others, the PTO, and suggesting Congress as the best tool to check 
that Federal Circuit’s expansion); Kumar, supra note 108, at 275–78 (“[T]he Federal 
Circuit filled a void left by Congress when it failed to grant the PTO full substantive 
rulemaking authority, and the Federal Circuit brought greater clarity and 
predictability to patent law.”); Vacca, supra note 111, at 758 (“By drafting a broadly-
worded Patent Act, [Congress] delegated its duty to set rules and policies.  By not 
giving the PTO authority to promulgate substantive rules . . . , Congress left it to the 
courts to flesh out rules and direct patent policy. . . . [T]he only institution that 
could handle the task was the Federal Circuit.”). 
 115. To be sure, some scholars have touted the non-regulatory nature of antitrust 
law as a virtue, rendering the adjudicative process largely immune to interest-group 
“capture.”  See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory 
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 698–70 (2009).  To the extent that patent regulation as 
discussed in this article stems in large part from the judiciary, however, concerns 
about preemption leading to increased capture should be mitigated.  See id. at 699 
(“Judges, by contrast, are much less subject to having their purpose diverted or to 
being captured.”). 
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III. THE EXTENT OF PATENT SUPERVISION 
Having outlined the sources of regulatory authority over patents 
and their general scope, the question posed by Credit Suisse’s four-part 
test may be properly answered:  over what kinds of activities is patent 
“regulatory authority” existing and exercised?116  This Part creates a 
rough hierarchy of potentially anticompetitive patent activities and 
analyzes the degree to which they are already squarely under 
supervision from patent authorities. 
To be clear, this Article does not argue that where patent 
regulatory authority supervises an activity, it will necessarily reach the 
same end results as antitrust law.  The Credit Suisse Court found it 
sufficient that the SEC had the legal authority to “supervise the 
activities in question”—and that the SEC actually “exercised” that 
authority—for the analysis to weigh in favor of preemption.117  The 
Court was not concerned with whether the outcome of that supervision 
matched the outcome that applying antitrust scrutiny would 
provide.118  On the contrary, it was the “risk that the securities and 
antitrust laws, if both applicable, would produce conflicting” outcomes 
in terms of “guidance . . . or standards of conduct” that further 
supported the case for preemption.119  The risk that simultaneous 
application of patent and antitrust laws will similarly produce 
conflicting guidance is analyzed in greater detail in Part IV. 
The argument for preemption is at its strongest across two 
categories of activity:  (1) attempts to expand the scope of a patent 
through licensing arrangements implicating other products or 
intellectual property and (2) attempts to exploit information 
asymmetry within the patent system.  As explained below, these two 
categories are already supervised through patent misuse doctrine, 
recordation requirements, and equitable estoppel doctrine.  The 
argument for preemption is somewhat weaker with respect to the 
next category of activity:  (3) attempts to control downstream use and 
sale of patented products.120  Patent exhaustion doctrine offers 
                                                     
 116. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275 (2007). 
 117. Id. at 275–77. 
 118. Id. at 282–85. 
 119. Id. at 275–76 (emphasis added). 
 120. “Patented products” (or “patented goods”) is used throughout the remainder 
of this Article as shorthand for products that are either themselves patented (for 
example, a “machine” or “composition of matter”) or designed to practice a 
patented “method.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (establishing categories of patentable 
subject matter).  See generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT 
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limited supervision of this category such that some antitrust 
intervention may be warranted.  The argument for preemption is at 
its weakest across the final two categories of activity:  (4) collusion 
with competitors through patent pooling or cross-licensing and (5) 
mergers with competitors through patent acquisition or transfer.  
There is little to no alternative supervision of these activities, and 
antitrust law brings considerable expertise and specialization to bear 
on these types of cases.  In table form: 
 
Category of Activity Level of Preemption 
(1) Licensing arrangements 
implicating other products/intellectual 
property Full preemption:  minimal need for 
antitrust intervention 
(2) Attempts to exploit information 
asymmetry 
(3) Attempts to control downstream 
use/sale of patented products 
Quasi-preemption:  some need for 
antitrust intervention 
(4) Colluding with competitors 
through patent polling/cross-licensing No preemption:  full need for antitrust 
intervention (5) Merging with competitors through 
patent acquisition/transfer 
 
Of course, some potentially anticompetitive patent activities may 
not fit neatly into the taxonomy above.  But these categories should at 
least provide a useful rubric against which courts and policymakers 
considering potential antitrust intervention may judge other patent 
activities.  Patent activities comparable to those in the latter 
categories may require at least partial application of the antitrust 
laws; patent activities comparable to those in the higher categories 
are likely supervised by patent law to such an extent that Credit Suisse 
analysis would endorse preemption. 
A. Full Preemption 
The Credit Suisse arguments in favor of preemption are at their 
strongest across two general categories of potentially anticompetitive 
patent activities.  The first category is attempts to expand the scope of a 
patent by using licensing arrangements that implicate other products 
or intellectual property.  The second category is attempts to exploit 
information asymmetry caused by opacity in the patent system.  These 
categories encompass patent activities that are already supervised by 
                                                     
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (explaining the 
distinctions between the categories in detail). 
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patent authority to such an extent that the need for antitrust 
intervention is minimal.  Permitting antitrust law and patent law to 
overlap in these contexts would therefore do more harm than good 
and would generate conflicting guidance and standards of conduct.121 
1. Attempts to expand the scope of a patent 
A patentee may attempt to expand the scope of their patent 
through licensing arrangements that implicate other products or 
intellectual property.  For example, as a condition of licensing a 
patent, a licensor may require a prospective licensee to also purchase 
licenses on their other patents (“package licensing”),122 or assign back 
any subsequent patents, such as improvements that the licensee 
creates (“grantbacks”).123  A licensor may require licensees to 
continue paying royalties for some period beyond the expiration of 
the patent or peg the royalties that licensees pay to products 
completely unrelated to the licensed patent.124 
What these scenarios have in common is that they feature patent 
owners using their patents as leverage, extending the limited scope of 
their grant of monopoly power to include other goods or intellectual 
property via licensing arrangements.  In other words, they are 
attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent.  
Noting the potential for this activity to disrupt the marketplace and 
reduce incentives to innovate, many scholars,125 practitioners,126 and 
                                                     
 121. See infra Part IV. 
 122. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION 103–07 (2007) [hereinafter PROMOTING INNOVATION], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf; 
Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2016); 
William D. Coston, The Patent-Antitrust Interface:  Are There Any No-No’s Today?, 
VENABLE LLP (2013), https://www.venable.com/the-patent-antitrust-interface--are-
there-any-no-nos-today/; Howard Ullman, A Modern Look at the 9 Patent Licensing ‘No-
Nos’, ORRICK (2013), https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2013/02/A-Modern-Look-At-
The-9-Patent-Licensing-NoNos. 
 123. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122, at 90–93; Coston, supra note 
122; Ullman, supra note 122. 
 124. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122, at 115–19; Coston, supra 
note 122; Ullman, supra note 122. 
 125. For examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention in the context 
of package licensing, see generally Michael A. Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities:  Six 
Actions the Antitrust Agencies Can Take, 1 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Winter 2013, at 1, 2–
3, 10–11; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1119, 1120–21 (2012).  For examples of academics supporting 
antitrust intervention in the context of patent grantbacks, see Robin Feldman, The 
Open Source Biotechnology Movement:  Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 
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policymakers127 have proposed antitrust interventions.  However, the 
Credit Suisse Court would recognize that regulatory authority within 
the patent world already exists to supervise this activity in the form of 
patent misuse doctrine. 
Patent misuse is an equitable defense to infringement based on the 
principle of unclean hands.128  This principle is “intended to prevent 
a patent-holder from extending the power of a patent beyond the 
scope of the patent itself.”129  When an alleged infringer raises the 
defense of patent misuse, the key question becomes whether “the 
patentee . . . ‘impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal 
scope” of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.’”130  If so, the 
patent becomes “unenforceable until the misuse is purged.”131 
Each of the potentially anticompetitive activities listed above—
package licensing, grantbacks, and royalty manipulation—have been 
examined through the lens of patent misuse.132  The misuse doctrine is a 
                                                     
153–58 (2004); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property:  From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 197 (1997).  For 
examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention for anticompetitive royalty 
schemes, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago 
in Support of Neither Party at 6–9, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 
2015 WL 1048416 (2015) (No. 13-720); Leslie Ware & Jaden Warren, Rule of Reason 
for Post-Expiration Patent Royalties, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 37, 40–42 (2016). 
 126. See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott, Abuse of Dominance by Patentees:  A Pro-Innovation 
Perspective, ANTITRUST SOURCE 6–11 (Oct. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/conten 
t/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct14_abbott_10_21f.authcheckdam.pdf 
(advocating for antitrust intervention where patent owners exceed “the legitimate 
scope of a patent right”); Coston, supra note 122; Intellectual Property & Antitrust 
Issues:  Licensing Restrictions, PATENTBARISTAS (Sept. 9, 2011, 11:01 AM), 
http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2011/09/09/intellectual-property-
antitrust-issues-licensing-restrictions/ (arguing that where package licensing and 
grantbacks are concerned, patent law and antitrust law must work in tandem, not 
separately); Ullman, supra note 122. 
 127. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122, at 103–14 (arguing that 
antitrust law should play a significant role in policing package licensing, grantbacks, 
and potentially anticompetitive royalty schemes). 
 128. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The 
defense of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, and 
relates generally to the use of patent rights to obtain or to coerce an unfair 
commercial advantage.”). 
 129. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Princo v. International Trade Commission:  Antitrust Law 
and the Patent Misuse Doctrine Part Company, 25 ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 62, 62. 
 130. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 131. Id. at 1427. 
 132. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015) 
(upholding the misuse analysis in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)); Brulotte, 
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natural fit to supervising these activities, tasked as it is with finding the 
boundary between the inherently anticompetitive effects of patent grant 
and enforcement133 and the anticompetitive effects of patentee 
overreach.134  While not all of these activities have been found to 
constitute patent misuse in all cases, the doctrine of patent misuse is, at a 
minimum, applicable to the activities.  Because these activities rely on the 
power to demand licenses, when patent misuse is found—and the patent 
hence becomes unenforceable—the patentee loses the power to 
continue their scheme.  As a result, these activities are already supervised 
through patent law; antitrust intervention is, in a sense, duplicative. 
Moreover, this supervision is regulatory in nature:  the ITC and the 
Federal Circuit exercise significant authority over what constitutes 
patent misuse.  Misuse is a defense under the Tariff Act,135 so that the 
regulatory authority the ITC exercises over matters of patent validity 
and enforceability136 would include determining the proper scope of 
misuse.  Similarly, because the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over infringement cases,137 defenses to 
infringement, such as misuse, would be included in its de facto 
rulemaking authority.138  Between the ITC and the Federal Circuit, 
then, it appears that patent misuse offers the legal authority to 
oversee activities such as package licensing, grantbacks, and royalty 
manipulation.139  The existence of this authority and its pattern of 
usage thus weighs in favor of preemption under Credit Suisse’s 
analysis.140 
                                                     
379 U.S. at 30 (examining post-expiration royalties as potential patent misuse); 
Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 660 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (examining 
royalty payments pegged to sales of unrelated products as potential patent misuse); 
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(examining package licensing as potential patent misuse); Duplan Corp. v. Deering 
Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 757 (D.S.C. 1977) (examining grantbacks as potential 
patent misuse), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).  See generally 
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 476 (2011) 
(discussing judicial application of misuse to package licensing and grantbacks). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
 134. See Oliver, supra note 129, at 63. 
 135. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012) (“[E]quitable defenses may be presented in all 
cases.”); see also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (discussing the ITC’s rejection of a misuse claim). 
 136. See supra Section II.B (discussing the ITC’s regulatory authority). 
 137. See supra notes 94–96. 
 138. See supra Section II.C (discussing the Federal Circuit’s quasi-agency functions). 
 139. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275 (2007). 
 140. Id. at 277. 
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2. Attempts to exploit information asymmetry 
A patentee may also attempt to exploit information asymmetry 
caused by opacity in the patent system.  For example, standard-setting 
organizations (“SSOs”) are voluntary industry groups that exist to 
develop and promote industry standards to improve interoperability 
of their products—such as the 3G standard that many cell phone 
manufacturers have adopted, allowing their different phones to all 
communicate with any 3G-conforming cell towers.141  In the process 
of weighing the costs and benefits of using different technologies in 
their standard, SSOs will ask members to disclose any relevant patents 
the members may have.142  Those with relevant patents may be asked 
to agree to certain royalty arrangements, such as royalty caps, in 
exchange for their inclusion in the standard.143  But a member might 
instead conceal its relevant patents, wait until the SSO has unwittingly 
adopted an infringing standard—“and investments have been made 
to commit to the new technology”—and then demand exorbitant 
royalties, a practice known as “hold-up.”144 
For another example, retributional and reputational concerns 
typically act to constrain patentees’ enforcement activity.  In terms of 
retribution, rival companies likely “each possess patents that 
implicate one another’s products,” so “they enter into cross licenses 
                                                     
 141. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(addressing the 3G standard created by an SSO and the competing standards).  See 
generally Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard 
Essential Patents Licensing Problem, 3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Winter 2013, at 1, 2; Anne 
Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations:  
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671 (2007). 
 142. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 141, at 672. 
 143. Frequently, SSOs will ask patent owners to agree to license their relevant 
patents on so-called “FRAND” terms:  licensing terms that are fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory.  See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 141, at 671–72; Koren W. 
Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Royalty Rates and Damages, FTC (Oct. 
22, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations 
/wong-ervin_aba_program_frand_royalty_rates_10-22-14.pdf.  This practice, and the 
tension it has created, is discussed in greater detail infra Part V. 
 144. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 7, at 470; Jorge L. Contreras, Equity, 
Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the Patent Unenforceability Remedy, ANTITRUST SOURCE 2 
(Oct. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_ 
source/oct11_contreras_10_24f.authcheckdam.pdf (“[B]efore a standard is locked-
in, the industry may choose among various technical alternatives:  some may be 
covered by patents and others may not.  Patented technology must compete with 
unpatented technology on the basis of factors including price and technical quality.  
After lock-in, however, the cost of switching to a new standard increases dramatically, 
and patent holders who emerge without warning have significant, and arguably 
improper, leverage to charge rents to implementers of the standard.”). 
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or (similarly) abstain from suing one another . . . [in] the patent 
equivalent of . . . mutual assured destruction.”145  In terms of 
reputation, patentees may face “customers exerting pressure to settle 
litigation or shareholders skeptical of patent enforcement.”146  Where 
patentees hope to engage with SSOs, “a reputation as a non-aggressor 
can increase the likelihood that a firm’s technology is included in 
standards.”147  But by transferring their patents to a shell subsidiary or 
third party who engages in litigation on their behalf, patentees may 
avoid those concerns by obfuscating their link to the patent or the 
litigation, a maneuver known as “privateering.”148 
What these scenarios have in common is that they feature patent 
owners exploiting information asymmetry, using opacity in patent 
ownership to gain leverage and even raise the operating costs of their 
competitors.  Noting the anticompetitive potential of these activities, 
many scholars,149 practitioners,150 and policymakers151 have proposed 
                                                     
 145. See Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and 
Antitrust:  Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE 4 (Apr. 2013), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2013/04/Antitrust-Attacks-on-
Patent-Assertion-Entities.pdf (explaining the deterrence effects of defensive 
patenting). 
 146. Carrier, supra note 125, at 7. 
 147. Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 145, at 4. 
 148. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 8, at 192–94, 199; Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, 
Opening Remarks at the Computer & Communications Industry Association and 
American Antitrust Institute Program, Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities:  
What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do 7 (June 20, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/defa 
ult/files/documents/public_statements/competition-law-patent-assertion-entities-
what-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/130620paespeech.pdf (stating that privateering, 
through “a lack of transparency,” enables assertion without “mutually assured 
destruction by proxy”). 
 149. For examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention in the context 
of holdup, see Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion 
in Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123 (2009); Robert A. 
Skitol, Concerted Buyer Power:  Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in 
Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727 (2005).  For examples of academics 
supporting antitrust intervention in the context of privateering, see Carrier, supra 
note 125, at 2; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 145; Comments of the American 
Antitrust Institute to the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice 
on Patent Assertion Entities (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/wor 
kshops/pae/comments/paew-0011.pdf; Comments of Phillip Malone, Harvard Law 
School, Patent Assertion Entities Activities Workshop 155–56 (Dec. 10, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Patent%20Assert
ion%20Entity%20Activities%20Workshop%20/pae_transcript.pdf. 
 150. See, e.g., Eli Dourado, How Patent Privateers Have Eroded Mutually Assured 
Destruction in the Computer Industry, ÜMLAUT (Oct. 2, 2013), 
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antitrust interventions.  However, just as above, the Credit Suisse Court 
would recognize that regulatory authority within the patent world 
already exists to supervise these activities, this time in the form of 
patent ownership recordation and equitable estoppel. 
Thanks to recordation requirements, the PTO has a wealth of 
information at its disposal regarding patent ownership.  The PTO 
maintains records on initial patent assignees as well as current 
assignees.152  It knows whether patents have been subjected to 
reexamination and “who requested the reexamination” as well as who 
has been paying maintenance fees for which patents.153  The PTO 
even knows “whether or not the current owner is a large or small 
entity.”154  While not all of this information is currently accessible to 
the public,155 policymakers and industry members are already 
working to expand availability.156  Together, this information 
                                                     
https://theumlaut.com/2013/10/02/patent-privateers/; Comments of Google, 
Blackberry, Earthlink & Red Hat to the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. 
Department of Justice on Patent Assertion Entities 16 (Apr. 5, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2013/04/15/paew-0049.pdf. 
 151. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122 (determining that antitrust 
law should play a significant role in policing holdup); Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne 
Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on 
Patent Assertion Entity Activities—“Follow the Money”, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 437 (2014) 
(contending that antitrust law should play a significant role in policing privateering); 
Julie Brill, Commissioner, FTC, Introductory Remarks at the Innovation Policy 
Summit, The Need for Patent Litigation Reform (Jan. 8, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/191751/140108pat
entlitigation.pdf (remarking on the FTC’s extensive review of antitrust intervention 
in patent law). 
 152. Colleen V. Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law 6 (Santa Clara 
Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 03-12, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1995664. 
 153. Id. at 6–7. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.; see also Sipe, supra note 8, at 203 (observing the difficulties in determining 
patent ownership). 
 156. For examples of such proposals, see Patent Transparency and Improvements 
Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring anyone filing a patent 
infringement suit to disclose all parties with a financial interest in the outcome or 
“any other kind of interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding”); Fact Sheet:  White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, WHITE 
HOUSE OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (June 4, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues 
(recommending that Congress require disclosure of the “Real Party-in-Interest” on 
patents and directing the PTO to begin its rulemaking process to improve 
transparency); Defend Innovation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://defendinnovation.org/proposal/improve-notice-function.html (last visited 
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“point[s] the recipient of a privateer’s demand letter in the direction 
of” its true instigator and provides SSOs with the tools to mitigate the 
surprise of hold-up.157 
Hold-up activity is also supervised by the equitable estoppel doctrine.  
Equitable estoppel is a defense to patent infringement,158 requiring 
misleading conduct, which may include not only statements and 
actions but silence and inaction, leading another to reasonably 
infer that rights will not be asserted against it; (2) reliance upon 
this conduct; and (3) due to this reliance, material prejudice if the 
delayed assertion of such rights is permitted.159 
Equitable estoppel is “founded on principles of fraud,” intended to 
prevent one party from taking “unfair advantage of another.”160  
Having induced the other party to rely on certain behavior from you, 
you are estopped from behaving otherwise and taking advantage of 
that reliance. 
In this sense, equitable estoppel appears tailor-made to police hold-
up, and it has in fact already been recognized by the courts as a valid 
defense in hold-up cases.161  As one federal court applying equitable 
estoppel against hold-up explained, 
Ten years before this suit was filed, plaintiff concluded that the 
proposed Thrift or MINTS standard infringed his patent.  It was 
well known to plaintiff and throughout the industry that the same 
provisions the plaintiff is relying on for infringement were being 
contemplated as national and international standards.  
Moreover, . . . plaintiff sat on an American National Standard 
                                                     
Nov. 30, 2016) (“All patent owners should be required to keep their disclosures up to 
date throughout the life of the patent, or else the patent will be unenforceable.  For 
example, patent owners should be required to update ownership and litigation 
records in a timely fashion.”). 
 157. Sipe, supra note 8, at 205. 
 158. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 159. Mabus v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 633 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 734 
(Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 160. Equitable Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 161. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (limiting patent enforceability for breach of affirmative duty to disclose 
pending patent applications to an SSO); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., 
Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing equitable estoppel from an 
implied license but noting the applicability of both to the SSO hold-up context); 
Stambler v. Diebold Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709, 1714 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s “intentionally misleading silence” barred plaintiff’s patent infringement 
claim under equitable estoppel), aff’d, 878 F.2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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Institute standards committee . . . .  Plaintiff subsequently left the 
committee without notifying it of the alleged infringement of his 
patent.  Under these circumstances, plaintiff had a duty to speak 
out . . . and his silence was affirmatively misleading.  Plaintiff could 
not remain silent while an entire industry implemented the 
proposed standard and then when the standards were adopted 
assert that his patent covered what manufacturers believed to be an 
open and available standard.162 
Certainly, where a patentee was a member of an SSO and failed to 
disclose ownership of potentially relevant patents when asked, the 
doctrine applies.163  And the latter two prongs—reliance and material 
prejudice—would be relatively easy to prove in nearly any standard-
setting context.164 
Together then, recordation requirements and equitable estoppel 
evince supervisory authority under the patent laws for activities that 
abuse opacity in ownership.  The former is administered directly by 
the PTO, and the latter—as a defense to infringement like misuse—is 
another regulatory tool wielded by the ITC and Federal Circuit.165 
As with the discussion of patent misuse above,166 this Article 
concedes that patent recordation and equitable estoppel will not 
necessarily provide the same outcomes in privateering and hold-up 
cases as a full-throated application of antitrust law.  Rather, 
independent of outcome, Credit Suisse’s preemption analysis would 
recognize the existence and applicability of these alternative regulatory 
solutions to opacity problems as weighing in favor of preemption.  The 
risks associated with permitting both regulatory apparatuses to overlap, 
explored in detail in Part IV, are simply too great. 
B. Quasi-Preemption:  Attempts to Control Downstream Use and Sale 
The Credit Suisse arguments in favor of preemption are somewhat 
weaker where attempts to control downstream product markets are 
concerned; supervision and intervention from patent authority is 
incomplete, and antitrust law has a more natural role to play.  The 
partial regulation from patent authority does, however, support 
                                                     
 162. Stambler, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714–15. 
 163. Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11, 23 (2009) (noting that equitable estoppel in the hold-up 
context may require “an affirmative communication between two parties,” such as a 
patentee submitting an incomplete list of relevant patents). 
 164. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 8, at 212–13. 
 165. See supra Sections II.B–C. 
 166. See supra Sections II.A.1–2. 
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relaxing the higher levels of scrutiny that antitrust law currently applies 
to downstream product controls whenever patents are involved. 
The previous Section focused largely on patent licensing 
arrangements.  But a patentee may also attempt to exert control over the 
downstream product market, dictating how its patented products are 
used or sold.  For example, a patentee may require that purchasers of its 
patented goods refrain from combining them with any competitor’s 
goods.167  If the patentee outsources production to a licensed 
manufacturer, it may limit the manufacturer to making the product 
within certain specifications and potential uses or limit the manufacturer 
to selling the product to a certain customer base.168  A patentee may 
even try to forbid sales of its patented product below a certain price.169 
What these scenarios have in common is that they feature patent 
owners attempting to directly control aspects of the downstream 
product market—the customers, prices, and uses.  In other words, 
they are attempts to exert control not over who may practice the 
patent but, rather, what happens to any patented products.  As with 
the scenarios given in the previous Section, scholars170 and 
policymakers171 have proposed full-throated antitrust interventions to 
curtail attempts by patentees to exert downstream market control.  
The Credit Suisse Court, however, would recognize that regulatory 
authority within the patent world already exercises partial supervision 
in the form of patent exhaustion doctrine. 
Patent exhaustion, like patent misuse, is a defense to 
infringement.172  It dictates “that the initial authorized sale of a 
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”173  As a result, 
once a patented item is “lawfully made and sold, there is no 
                                                     
 167. Coston, supra note 122; Ullman, supra note 122. 
 168. Coston, supra note 122; Ullman, supra note 122. 
 169. See, e.g., Coston, supra note 122; Ullman, supra note 122. 
 170. For examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention where a 
patentee attempts to control downstream product customers, prices, and uses, see 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 922 (2008); Ashley 
Doty, Note, Leegin v. PSKS:  New Standard, New Challenges, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
655, 683 (2008); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Resale Price Maintenance:  Consignment 
Agreements, Copyrighted or Patented Products and the First Sale Doctrine (Univ. Iowa Legal 
Studies, Research Paper No. 10-42, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1671943. 
 171. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 25–31 (1995), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf. 
 172. Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 173. Id. at 1373 (quoting Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 
625 (2008)). 
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restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of the 
patentee.”174  An infringement claim based on downstream use or sale 
will therefore be dismissed as a matter of law.175 
Each of the potentially anticompetitive activities listed above—
controlling uses, pricing, and customer bases—has been examined 
through the lens of patent exhaustion.176  Just as with patent misuse, 
however, the doctrine is not quite coterminous with antitrust law.177  
And because exhaustion is a defense to infringement, the same 
sources of regulatory authority offer supervision.178  The result thus 
far has been findings of exhaustion in most cases where a patentee 
attempts to exercise control over the downstream product market.179 
However, unlike with patent misuse, the applicability of exhaustion 
may not support full preemption of antitrust law.  Because these 
activities center on the patented goods themselves—rather than 
licensing arrangements—a defense to patent infringement will not 
itself destroy the anticompetitive scheme; the patentee may still 
                                                     
 174. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 630 (alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 
U.S. 453, 457 (1873)). 
 175. Keurig, 732 F.3d at 1372–73. 
 176. See, e.g., Quanta, 553 U.S. at 630 (applying exhaustion doctrine to an attempt 
by Intel to force purchasers of its patented microprocessors to only combine them 
with other Intel computer components); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 
U.S. 436, 451 (1940) (applying exhaustion doctrine to an attempt by Ethyl Gasoline 
to forbid retailers from selling its patented gasoline mixture below certain prices); 
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (applying 
exhaustion doctrine to an attempt by Western Electric to forbid retailers from selling 
its patented vacuum tubes specifically to commercial movie theaters); Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying exhaustion 
doctrine to an attempt by Mallinckrodt to forbid purchasers of its patented aerosol 
device from refurbishing or refilling the devices for additional uses). 
 177. The Federal Circuit did at one point treat patent exhaustion as coterminous 
with antitrust violations.  See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701.  That approach was 
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court.  See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 618; see also 
Samuel F. Ernst, Of Printer Cartridges and Patent Exhaustion:  The En Banc Federal Circuit 
Is Poised to Clarify Quanta, PATENTLYO (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/04/cartridges-exhaustion-clarify.html 
(“Significantly, the Supreme Court makes no mention of market power, the ‘rule of 
reason,’ or any other antitrust policy as the basis for its decision in Quanta.  Patent 
exhaustion is not merely a reiteration of antitrust law.”). 
 178. See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
 179. The notable exception to this practice has been courts permitting restrictions 
that apply to the initial sale of a patented product; for example, a patentee dictating 
the price or market in which a licensed manufacturer may sell.  See, e.g., Samuel F. 
Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant:  Should Parties Be Able to Contract 
Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 445, 454 
(citing Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 181). 
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attempt to enforce its control over downstream use and sale via other 
legal mechanisms—contract law, for example.180 
Rather than full preemption, this Article advocates a middle-tier, 
measured approach with regard to attempts to regulate the 
downstream product market.  The current trend in antitrust courts is 
to generally treat downstream controls on patented goods as more 
“inherently suspicious” than unpatented goods.181  But because 
exhaustion effectively dissolves the patent angle of these activities,182 
antitrust courts should instead proceed as if they are dealing with 
unpatented products when engaging in their analysis.  This will 
prevent many of the dangers of doctrinal overlap:  antitrust courts 
will not need to consider—or adjudicate—patent issues in their 
analysis.183  This middle-tier approach to antitrust intervention stands 
in contrast to the analysis for attempts at merger and collusion, 
outlined below, where the patents at issue are in full force and 
infringement suits themselves threaten competition as a result. 
C. No Preemption:  Attempts to Collude and Merge 
The Credit Suisse arguments in favor of preemption are at their 
weakest where patents are essentially used as instruments of collusion 
or merger.  Supervision and intervention from patent authority are 
essentially absent, and antitrust law is operating within its 
foundational competency.  For example, two competitors may 
                                                     
 180. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 
(2007) (examining an attempt to control downstream resale prices with contract 
law); In re Fair Allocation Sys., Inc., 126 F.T.C. 626, 635–36 (1998) (examining an 
attempt to control downstream market territory and quantities with contract law).  
See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance, in 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 1841, 1841 (2008) (examining the impact and efficacy of contractual limits 
on downstream price and nonprice attributes). 
 181. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm:  The First Sale 
Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 492 (2011) (citing Quanta as 
an example of the higher scrutiny applied to downstream controls when patents are 
concerned). 
 182. While the patentee may retain indirect control over certain aspects of the 
downstream product market—for example, what price manufacturers may charge for 
the initial sale—they have lost the unique patent advantage against downstream users 
and retailers:  infringement.  See id. at 492 (noting that the reason “presence of an IP 
right make[s] a difference” in analyzing effects on competition is because 
“infringement actions have different advantages and pose different problems” than 
mere “contract actions”). 
 183. The likelihood of antitrust courts to make mistakes and generate inefficiency 
while analyzing patent issues is examined in detail infra Part IV. 
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attempt to pool their patents in a third-party holding company, and 
use it to sue all of their other competitors for infringement, 
effectively cartelizing the market.184  One company may also attempt 
to acquire its competitor’s patent portfolio, effectively engaging in a 
merger and concentrating market share.185 
The middle-tier approach outlined above186 would not be effective 
for actions that concentrate market share.  Because these actions 
concern the market for intellectual property rights—either pooling 
or acquisition thereof—the existence of the patents cannot be 
ignored.  On the other hand, antitrust courts analyzing these 
activities would have to engage in relatively little adjudication of 
actual patent issues.187  Instead, they would be drawing upon the core 
                                                     
 184. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 383 (2003) (arguing that competitors’ attempts to pool 
or cross-license patents should be subject to strict antitrust analysis); ROBERT C. 
MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:  CARTELS AND BIDDING 
RINGS 151 (2012) (discussing the effects of cartels on other members of the market); 
Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., 
Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech 
/cross-licensing-and-antitrust-law. 
 185. See Fiona M. Scott Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Econ. Analysis, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Patent Portfolio Acquisitions:  An Economic 
Analysis 6–10 (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518966/download; 
Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 
463, 484–85 (2014). 
 186. See supra Section III.B. 
 187. For example, where two competitors cross-license and then agree (implicitly 
or explicitly) to sue all other competitors out of the market, the court does not need 
to engage in a lengthy analysis of the patents at issue or take up claim construction in 
order to determine market power; predatory collusion between competitors is per se 
an antitrust violation.  See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–97 
(1963).  See generally Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1213–15 (2008).  Where portfolio 
acquisitions are concerned, some interpretation of the patents may be required.  But 
in many cases, an analysis of the downstream market itself—that is, the market for 
the products practicing the competitors’ patents—would be sufficient and would 
avoid much of the need to delve into the patents themselves.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 287 (1948); FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 
1242 (8th Cir. 2011); Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its 
Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings 
Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in 
Motion Ltd., U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. PUB. AFF. (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its-
decision-close-its-investigations (“The division concluded that each of the [portfolio] 
transactions was unlikely to substantially lessen competition for wireless devices.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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foundational competencies of antitrust law:  policing collusion and 
regulating mergers.188 
Moreover, these core competencies are unique to antitrust.  None 
of the tools of patent regulation mentioned above—misuse, 
recordation, estoppel, or exhaustion—have been applied to curtail 
collusive behavior or regulate portfolio mergers.  Therefore, even 
bearing in mind the considerable limitations and flaws of antitrust 
law—uncertainty, inefficiency, and imprecision, among others189—
the argument for preemption is at its weakest in this sphere.  The key 
questions in Credit Suisse’s analysis would not be satisfied because 
patent law offers no true alternative supervision.  Limiting antitrust 
law intervention in the patent sphere to where it is strictly necessary—
as it is here—offers a solution to minimize the potential for 
conflicting guidance and error due to overlap. 
Actavis is instructive on this point.  In the reverse payment scheme 
used in Actavis, a patent owner pays a potential competitor to delay 
bringing its competing product to market.190  This is “effectively . . . a 
cartel.”191  In this scenario, the patent owner and the potential 
                                                     
 188. The Clayton Act, for example, was specifically designed to prohibit 
companies “whose primary purpose is to hold stocks of other companies” to form a 
collusive trust.  See DAVID DALE MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 31 (1959).  In 
terms of regulating mergers, the specialization and institutional competence of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) is substantial, to say the least.  See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/repo 
rt_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (determining that the expanded merger 
review process used since the 1970s “has led to the development of substantial 
expertise within” the DOJ and FTC); Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional 
Design of U.S. Merger Review:  Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 
159, 174 (noting that the DOJ and FTC have “substantial expertise[,] including 
lawyers and economists who have spent virtually their entire careers analyzing 
mergers”); Nick Cibula, Note, It’s Always a Good Time for a Beer, but What About the 
Hops?, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 157, 176 (2013) (arguing that the DOJ and FTC have 
“expansive expertise to determine antitrust concerns” such as “merger[s] and 
acquisitions”); see also Sipe, supra note 8, at 222 (describing collusion and merger 
concerns as the “foundations of antitrust law”). 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 8–15. 
 190. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (providing an example of a 
reverse-payment scheme); see also supra text accompanying notes 41–42. 
 191. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 854 (Cal. 2015) (applying Actavis and 
holding that reverse-payment settlement agreements are not immune from antitrust 
scrutiny); see also Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements:  A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2009) (comparing reverse 
payments to collusive market division via “eliminate[ed] competition between 
rivals”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s 
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competitor are colluding to restrict output to charge higher prices to 
consumers and splitting the profits between them.  In that sense, the 
patent regulatory tools discussed above offer no solution.  There is no 
overreaching licensing arrangement, for example, that patent misuse 
could snuff out.  Instead, antitrust law offers its core strengths and 
competencies, and largely without needing to adjudicate patent-
specific issues at all.  Indeed, as the Actavis Court found compelling 
in its decision, in reverse payment antitrust cases “it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity,” as the antitrust question turns on 
the collusive conduct itself.192  Credit Suisse - style concerns are 
therefore at their lowest ebb. 
To the extent the hierarchy outlined in this Part remains 
incomplete, it should nevertheless provide a useful rubric moving 
forward.  Anticompetitive activities—involving patents or otherwise—
defy entirely neat categorization.  New forms of anticompetitive 
behavior emerge with every novel addition to commerce and 
commercial structure.  Moreover, a single scheme may implicate 
multiple overlapping categories of activity.  But generally speaking, 
the above analysis reveals that anticompetitive activities relying on 
leveraging patents through licensing arrangements or information 
asymmetry are likely supervised through patent misuse doctrine, 
recordation requirements, and equitable estoppel doctrine.  Courts 
and policymakers should be skeptical of antitrust intervention against 
these kinds of activities and should strongly consider the possibility of 
preemption.  In the alternative, anticompetitive activities relying on 
downstream control of patented products are only partially 
supervised via patent exhaustion doctrine.  Preemption may be 
viable, but at least some antitrust intervention is likely warranted.  
Finally, anticompetitive activities relying on patents as instruments of 
collusion or merger have little to no supervision from patent 
authorities.  Despite skepticism of—and costs associated with—
antitrust law, courts and policymakers should not hesitate to apply 
full-throated antitrust intervention to these kinds of activities. 
                                                     
Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 8–9 (2014) (explaining the similarities 
in effect between a two-person cartel and a monopoly held by one person). 
 192. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.  But see Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic of 
Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 123–24 (2016) (arguing that the Court inappropriately 
equivocated patent validity with the terms of a reverse-payment settlement). 
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IV. RISK OF CONFLICT 
The previous two Parts examined the existing sources of regulatory 
authority in the patent context—the PTO, the ITC, and the Federal 
Circuit—to create a hierarchy of potentially anticompetitive patent 
activities, categorizing them based on the degree to which they are 
already under patent-specific supervision.  Where that alternative 
supervision exists, as the Credit Suisse Court recognized, the benefits 
of overlapping antitrust intervention are marginal.  Of equal—if not 
greater—concern, however, are the costs of overlapping antitrust 
intervention. 
The bulk of the Court’s analysis in Credit Suisse was dedicated to 
calculating those costs in the securities context.  Due to the “fine, 
complex, detailed line” separating activity the SEC permits and activity 
the SEC forbids, the “contradictory inferences” that might arise from 
identical behavior, the “need for securities-related expertise” in 
adjudication, the “risk of inconsistent court results,” and the danger of 
permitting plaintiffs to “dress what is essentially a securities complaint in 
antitrust clothing,” the Credit Suisse Court determined that “antitrust 
courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes” where they 
intervene with securities law.193  As a result, the Court stated, permitting 
antitrust law and securities law to overlap would likely “produce 
conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of 
conduct.”194  This Part extends that analysis to the patent context where 
the costs are equally substantial.  Each of the above concerns is just as 
pressing in the patent sphere—if not moreso. 
A. The Fine Lines of Patent Law 
In Credit Suisse, the Court characterized the line separating permissible 
and impermissible securities activity as “fine, complex, [and] 
detailed.”195  Accordingly, allowing antitrust and securities law to apply 
simultaneously would be particularly likely to produce conflicting 
guidance and requirements.  The Court illustrated this dilemma: 
It will often be difficult for someone who is not familiar with 
accepted syndicate practices to determine with confidence whether 
an underwriter has insisted that an investor buy more shares in the 
immediate aftermarket (forbidden), or has simply allocated more 
shares to an investor willing to purchase additional shares of that 
                                                     
 193. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279, 280–82, 284, 281–
82 (2007). 
 194. Id. at 275–76. 
 195. Id. at 279, 282. 
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issue in the long run (permitted).  And who but a securities expert 
could say whether the present SEC rules set forth a virtually 
permanent line, unlikely to change in ways that would permit the 
sorts of . . . conduct that it now seems to forbid?196 
Patent law is similarly replete with fine doctrinal lines separating 
the permissible and the forbidden.  To provide just a few key 
examples, the frameworks governing patent misuse, exhaustion, 
inequitable conduct, and contributory infringement are highly 
complex and continue to develop and evolve. 
As explained in Part III, patent misuse and exhaustion are 
equitable defenses to infringement.197  The former applies where a 
patentee “impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ 
of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”198  The patent then 
becomes “unenforceable until the misuse is purged.”199  The latter 
applies where a patented item has been “lawfully made and sold,” 
after which “there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the 
benefit of the patentee.”200  An infringement claim based on 
downstream use or sale will therefore be dismissed as a matter of 
law.201  The Federal Circuit, reviewing these defenses,202 is forced to 
thus grapple with complex, “murk[y]” questions.203  In terms of 
patent misuse:  What is outside the scope of any given patent grant?  
Has this particular patent been “leveraged” as part of the alleged 
anticompetitive scheme?  How should courts analyze and resolve 
portfolio—rather than individual patent—misuse?204  In terms of 
exhaustion:  Does the article sold sufficiently embody the “essential 
features” of the patent?205  To what extent can parties contract 
                                                     
 196. Id. at 280. 
 197. See supra notes 128–31, 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 198. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 199. Id. at 1427. 
 200. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 629–30 (2008) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873)). 
 201. Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 202. See supra notes 94–96 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction). 
 203. Oliver, supra note 129, at 67; see also John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of 
Patent Exhaustion:  A Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 646 (2004) (describing the “general statement” of 
patent exhaustion doctrine as “deceptively simple,” but acknowledging that courts’ 
application of the doctrine “has not been simple, straightforward, or consistent”). 
 204. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). 
 205. Osborne, supra note 203, at 646. 
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around exhaustion?206  As a result, there is already “foreseeable 
polymorphism” in the doctrines of patent misuse and exhaustion, 
and “unforeseeable strains of potential misbehaviors” are likely to 
emerge.207  Allowing generalist antitrust courts to intervene would 
only produce greater uncertainty and, ultimately, conflicting and 
inconsistent results. 
Inequitable conduct is another equitable defense to patent 
infringement.208  To successfully assert a claim of inequitable 
conduct, the accused infringer must show that the patentee failed to 
disclose information, such as prior art, in its patent application.209  
The patentee must also have “specific intent to deceive the PTO,” 
such that the “PTO would not have granted the patent but for [the] 
failure to disclose.”210  The remedy, as expressed by the Federal 
Circuit, is the “‘atomic bomb’ of patent law”:  “inequitable conduct 
regarding any single claim renders the entire patent 
unenforceable.”211  The result is a fine line to adjudicate.  Because the 
Federal Circuit has determined that “intent and materiality are 
separate elements . . . that . . . should not be put on a sliding scale 
with one another,” the crucial—and highly technical—question of 
whether or not the patentee’s alleged deception was the “but for” 
cause of the PTO’s grant must be addressed fully in every case.212  
Again, inconsistency and uncertainty would mar this already complex 
doctrine if antitrust courts were left to adjudicate these claims. 
                                                     
 206. See, e.g., Yuichi Watanabe, The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion:  The Impact of 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 273, 285–87 & nn.80–99 
(2009).  To wit, sufficiently egregious attempts to contract around exhaustion may 
themselves trigger misuse.  See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–12 
(7th Cir. 1982). 
 207. Richard Li-dar Wang, Deviated, Unsound, and Self-Retreating:  A Critical 
Assessment of the Princo v. ITC En Banc Decision, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51, 72–
73 (2012). 
 208. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (describing the use of inequitable conduct to “bar[] 
enforcement of a patent” and “dismiss patent cases involving egregious 
misconduct”). 
 209. Id. at 1290. 
 210. Id. at 1290, 1296. 
 211. Id. at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)). 
 212. James J. Schneider, Comment, Therasense-less:  How the Federal Circuit Let 
Policy Overtake Precedent in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 53 B.C. L. 
REV. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT 223, 229 (2012) (citing Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290), 
http://bclawreview.org/files/2012/04/18_schneider.pdf. 
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As opposed to direct infringement, contributory infringement 
covers situations where a party does not sell the patented article or 
practice the patented process, but instead 
offers to sell or sells . . . a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the 
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use . . . .213 
For a plaintiff’s claim of contributory infringement to succeed, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “knew that the 
combination for which its components were especially made was both 
patented and infringing,” and that the “components have ‘no substantial 
noninfringing uses.’”214  In practice, contributory infringement claims 
can be incredibly complex, not only in technical terms—understanding 
how components may be used together or separately in infringing or 
noninfringing ways—but doctrinally as well.  For example, there is a 
delicate line between raising a successful contributory infringement 
claim and impermissibly trying to extend the scope of one’s patent over 
unpatented devices—potentially triggering misuse.215  With the risk of a 
finding of unenforceability on one side and the possibility of rampant 
third-party infringement on the other, the costs of antitrust courts 
generating conflicting guidance or contributing to uncertainty in this 
doctrine would be quite high. 
Altogether, the degree of complexity associated with patent 
doctrines, such as misuse, exhaustion, inequitable conduct, and 
contributory infringement, weigh in favor of preemption under Credit 
Suisse’s analysis.  If permitted instead to overlap, there is a significant 
risk that patent law and antitrust law would produce conflicting 
guidance and requirements.  Just as generalist antitrust courts would 
struggle to distinguish permissible and forbidden securities 
                                                     
 213. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 214. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 215. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201 (1980) 
(determining that the owner of a process patent can only use contributory 
infringement to block the sale of unpatented “nonstaple goods” without triggering 
misuse).  See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse:  
Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 75 (1982) (exploring the 
historical and ongoing tension between the two doctrines of contributory 
infringement and patent misuse; in particular, the complexity of the post-Dawson 
staple-nonstaple dichotomy). 
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arrangements—and fail to accurately forecast potential changes in 
securities law216—they would struggle with the equally delicate and 
fine lines of patent doctrine. 
B. The Danger of Contradictory Inferences 
The Credit Suisse Court also pointed out the danger that 
contradictory inferences may be drawn from “overlapping evidence” 
showing both “unlawful antitrust activity and . . . lawful securities 
marketing activity,” which would further increase the odds of 
conflicting guidance and requirements from antitrust law and 
securities law.217  The Court provided the following example: 
[E]vidence tending to show unlawful antitrust activity and evidence 
tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may overlap, or 
prove identical. Consider, for instance, a conversation between an 
underwriter and an investor about how long an investor intends to 
hold the new shares (and at what price), say, a conversation that 
elicits comments concerning both the investor’s short and longer 
term plans.  That exchange . . . might help to establish an effort to 
collect an unlawfully high commission . . . through the sales of less 
popular stocks.  Or it might prove only that the underwriter 
allocates more popular shares to investors who will help stabilize 
the aftermarket share price.218 
This same concern—overlapping and similar, yet not coterminous 
standards—holds equally true for antitrust law and patent law.  The 
examples given in the previous Section are illustrative on this point as well:  
misuse, exhaustion, inequitable conduct, and contributory infringement.219 
Although anticompetitive effect is a necessary component of a 
successful claim of patent misuse,220 making the principles of antitrust 
                                                     
 216. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007). 
 217. Id. at 281–82. 
 218. Id. at 281. 
 219. See generally Deborah A. Garza, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice Antitrust Div., Remarks Before the Intellectual Property Owners Association, 
Antitrust and Competition Law, Standards Setting and Pharmaceutical Issues 
Committees Conference, The Increasing Role of Antitrust Principles in Defining 
Patent Rights (June 9, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/remarks-
increasing-role-antitrust-principles-defining-patent-rights (“And several aspects of 
patent law—such as misuse, patent exhaustion doctrine, and the standards used to 
determine whether an invention is patentable and whether to enjoin infringement—
are designed . . . to preserve and protect competition.”). 
 220. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (rejecting a misuse claim in part due to the alleged infringer’s failure to 
demonstrate anticompetitive effects). 
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law relevant, antitrust law and patent misuse are not coterminous.221  
Anticompetitive conduct that constitutes patent misuse may not rise 
to the level of an antitrust violation222 and vice versa.223  Though 
patent exhaustion is also intended to safeguard competition, it too is 
disjointed from antitrust liability.224  Similarly, while inequitable 
conduct has overlapping concerns with antitrust law,225 the two are 
not synchronized in terms of liability.226  With contributory 
infringement, there is considerable crossover—but also conflict—
with antitrust tying doctrine.227  Specifically, a patent owner may use 
                                                     
 221. The coterminous approach to antitrust and misuse was, in fact, specifically 
rejected by Congress the last time misuse doctrine was revisited via legislation.  See S. 
REP. NO. 100-492, at 17–18 (1988).  See generally Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse:  Must 
an Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (1989); Kenneth J. 
Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform:  “Blessed Be the Tie?”, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 2 n.9 (1991). 
 222. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 
(1969) (determining that even if the lower court found misuse, “it does not 
necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either 
[section] 1 or [section] 2 of the Sherman Act”). 
 223. See, e.g., Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329 (“While proof of an antitrust violation shows 
that the [patentee] has committed wrongful conduct having anticompetitive effects, 
that does not establish misuse of the patent in suit unless the conduct in question 
restricts the use of that patent and does so in one of the specific ways that have been 
held to be outside the otherwise broad scope of the patent grant.”). 
 224. See Garza, supra note 219; supra note 177. 
 225. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to 
Deceive the Patent Office, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 323, 325 (2011) (“Invalid patents 
undermine both the patent system and the competitive marketplace.  They raise 
entry costs and delay market entry, deter customers and business partners from 
contracting with new entrants . . . and hurt innovation.”); Christopher R. Leslie, The 
Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006) 
(“Even supporters of strong patent protection have generally not quarreled with 
antitrust law’s treatment of patents procured through fraud.”). 
 226. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 
172, 173, 177–78 (1965) (explaining that if “the exclusionary power of the illegal 
patent claim,” for example, is proved, “the maintenance and enforcement of a patent 
obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action under [section] 
2 of the Sherman Act,” but it is not so automatically); see also Nobelpharma AB v. 
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Walker Process . . . we have distinguished ‘inequitable 
conduct’ from Walker Process fraud, noting that inequitable conduct is a broader, 
more inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker 
Process counterclaim.”). 
 227. Tying is the more generic antitrust term for schemes like package licensing, 
wherein a purchaser is forced to purchase certain items together rather than 
individually.  See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and 
Exclusive Dealing, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183–85 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 
2010).  More precisely, it is an antitrust violation to use “market power” in one good 
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claims of contributory infringement to force purchases of unpatented 
goods upon consumers of patented products in a manner that may or 
may not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.228  Moreover, 
antitrust principles even come into play at the remedies stage for 
successful contributory infringement claims.229 
C. The Need for Patent-Related Expertise 
Another of the key reasons given in Credit Suisse as to why 
overlapping antitrust and securities law would produce conflict was 
the “need for securities-related expertise” in adjudication.230  
Specifically, the Court noted that the SEC has the “expertise to draw 
that line” between what should and should not be permissible under 
securities law.231  This same reasoning applies with equal, if not 
greater, force in the realm of patent law.  Patent law requires not only 
an understanding of patented technologies themselves—ranging 
from the particular biochemistry of pharmaceuticals to the pure 
number theory underpinning high-level cryptography—but also an 
                                                     
to force consumers to purchase an additional “tied” good, thereby “foreclos[ing] a 
substantial volume of commerce.”  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84–
85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (examining Microsoft’s practice of forcing 
consumers to purchase its Internet browser by bundling it into Microsoft’s operating 
system software). 
 228. Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2006).  Professor Adams argues 
that it was the early abuses of contributory infringement that led to the creation of 
the Clayton Act (and its prohibition of certain tying arrangements) in the first place.  
Id.  But, as with antitrust claims based on inequitable conduct under Walker Process, 
exclusionary market power must be shown to make out an antitrust violation and 
may not be present in every case of abusive contributory infringement claims.  See, 
e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (noting that “the 
mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support such a presumption” of 
market power). 
 229. Instead of an injunction, the court may engage in compulsory licensing, 
forcing the patentee to accept a given royalty from the infringer and permitting the 
infringer to legally practice the patent.  JAMES PACKARD LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L, RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS 3–6 (2007), 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf.  These “compulsory 
licenses are generally authorized” where an injunction would be “anti-competitive”—
even if the patentee has not committed an antitrust violation—or where there is 
otherwise significant “public need.”  Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to 
Innovation:  Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 859 (2003); see also Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory 
Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 397, 408 
& n.45 (1994). 
 230. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007). 
 231. Id. at 285. 
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understanding of potential economic effects on innovation, 
implementation, use, and downstream or substitute markets.  
Professor Wasserman summarizes the view among academics:  “There 
is near-universal agreement that the institution charged with creating 
sound patent policy needs access both to economic and to 
technological data, as well as sufficient expertise to analyze and 
interpret this information.”232 
The sources of regulatory authority outlined in Part II—the PTO, 
the ITC, and the Federal Circuit—are well-stocked with this exact 
expertise.  The PTO has classic information-gathering mechanisms at its 
disposal including hearings,233 research studies,234 and cross-contact with 
other agencies.235  This is in addition to the considerable expertise 
cultivated among scientifically-trained patent examiners,236 the 
Administrative Patent Judges on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,237 
and the staff within the newly created Office of the Chief Economist.238  
In short, “the PTO possesses superior pathways to acquire technological 
                                                     
 232. Wasserman, supra note 65, at 2008; see also Michael J. Burstein, Rules for 
Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1777–78 (2011) (“Patent policy in particular 
requires the application of technological and economic analysis . . . .”); Rai, supra 
note 56, at 1262 (“[E]xpertise in both economics and technology is a highly 
desirable attribute for any institution creating patent policy.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Transcripts of the Public Hearings on Biotechnology, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 17, 1994, 9:00 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com 
/hearings/biotech/biotrans.html. 
 234. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
PROTECTIONS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 1–3 (2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20120113-ippr_report.pdf. 
 235. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 56, at 1255–57 (noting the dialogue between the 
National Institutes of Health and the PTO regarding DNA patent policy). 
 236. As of 2014, the PTO had employed more than 9300 patent examiners to 
process over 618,000 patent applications. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:  FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 11, 143 (2014) 
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY], https://www.uspto.gov/about/strat 
plan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf. 
 237. From late 2014 to mid-2015, between 214 and 235 judges on the PTAB 
adjudicated over 9900 examination appeals.  NATHAN K. KELLEY & SCOTT R. BOALICK, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE, 7, 34 
(2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150820_PPAC_PTA 
B_Update.pdf; PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 236, at 55.  The PTAB 
also heard 1310 AIA petitions, including post-grant and inter partes reviews.  U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 4 (2015), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-04-30%20PTAB.pdf. 
 238. Office of Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ 
about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-international-affairs/office-chief-
economist (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
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and economic data, as well as the expertise to evaluate and analyze this 
information to craft substantive patent law standards.”239 
The ITC, given its statutory requirement to adjudicate patent 
infringement claims,240 has not only a “high level of expertise in 
patent law” but also “deep knowledge of the narrow range of 
technologies that are repeatedly the subject of section 337 
investigations,”241 such as telecommunications, computers, and 
medical technology.242  Furthermore, the ITC has developed 
considerable economic expertise, given its need to consider “antitrust 
and equitable principles, and the public policy of promoting ‘free 
competition’” in its decision making.243  Altogether, the depth and 
breadth of the ITC’s expertise has been recognized by an array of 
scholars,244 and even the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit.245 
The Federal Circuit’s own expertise in patent law is considerable.  
The court’s jurisdiction includes all appeals arising under the Patent 
Act246 in addition to appeals of patent decisions from the PTO247 and 
                                                     
 239. Wasserman, supra note 65, at 2018. 
 240. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 78–85.  In 2014, the ITC had ninety-three active section 337 investigations 
involving determinations of patent infringement.  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FY 2014 
AT A GLANCE:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2015), 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/yir_op2_2015.pdf. 
 241. Kumar, supra note 80, at 1586. 
 242. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 240, at 1 
(providing statistics on the different products involved in section 337 investigations). 
 243. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974) (discussing the ITC’s role in investigating 
complaints, as envisioned by the Tariff Act); see also Kumar, supra note 80, at 1563 
(stating that the scope of the ITC’s determinations “encompasses, at minimum, 
issues involving patents, international trade, and antitrust law”). 
 244. See, e.g., Maria Raia Hamilton, Process Patents and the Limits of the International 
Trade Commission’s Jurisdiction:  Finding the Line in the Sand, 50 IDEA 161, 183 n.121 
(2010) (indicating that ITC judges mostly hear patent disputes, so they are 
considered to have “greater technical expertise” than Article III judges); Kumar, 
supra note 80, at 1555; Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private 
Information in the U.S. Patent System:  A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 
¶ 106; Kali N. Murray, The Cooperation of Many Minds:  Domestic Patent Reform in a 
Heterogeneous Regime, 48 IDEA 289, 333 (2008); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 1702; 
Herbert C. Shelley et al., The Standard of Review Applied by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
1749, 1801 (1996). 
 245. See Interview by Douglas Lichtman with Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.ipcolloquium.com/ 
Programs/Players/4.html (describing the Administrative Law Judges within the ITC 
as “specialist” judges and—“loosely”—“expert patent judges”). 
 246. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012); see supra notes 94–96. 
 247. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 
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the ITC.248  This broad jurisdictional grant has led many to label the 
Federal Circuit as the unique “expert court” among the otherwise 
“generalist” regional federal appellate courts.249  In addition, the 
Federal Circuit’s exclusive position—both in terms of patent appeals 
and in reviewing the ITC and PTO—provides a natural bottleneck for 
expertise to converge and cross-pollinate. 
As the Court recognized in Credit Suisse, “antitrust courts are likely 
to make unusually serious mistakes” in areas of law where expertise is 
necessary.250  In addition, allowing generalist antitrust courts to 
encroach upon and shape patent law would effectively squander the 
considerable collective expertise of the PTO, the ITC, and the 
Federal Circuit.  This expertise mismatch strongly suggests the need 
for a minimally overlapping role for antitrust law and patent law, if 
not preemption entirely under Credit Suisse. 
D. The Risk of Inconsistency 
The Credit Suisse Court additionally noted the risk that antitrust 
courts, “with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert 
juries” will find it difficult to “reach consistent results” as a reason why 
antitrust law and securities law, if simultaneously applicable, would be 
likely to produce conflicting guidance and requirements.251  This risk 
looms large in the patent context as well.  As outlined above, the 
need for expertise in adjudicating patent disputes is substantial;252 as 
a result, nonexpert judges dealing with cases involving patents are apt 
to produce inconsistent results.  But there is also uncertainty and 
inconsistency built into the applicable antitrust doctrine itself:  in 
antitrust cases involving patents, courts have increasingly abandoned 
predictable rules and eliminated useful presumptions that might 
otherwise create consistency. 
                                                     
 248. § 1295(a)(5)–(6). 
 249. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1791, 1839 (2013); Kumar, supra note 80, at 1549, 1589; Banks Miller & Brett 
Curry, Experts Judging Experts:  The Role of Expertise in Reviewing Agency Decision Making, 
38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 55, 56, 60 (2013); Amy R. Motomura, Federal Circuit Deference:  
Two Regimes in Conflict, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 925, 952 (2015); Joan E. Schaffner, Federal 
Circuit “Choice of Law”:  Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1176, 
1179, 1218 (1996) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should have broader authority to 
assert independent judgment on “all substantive law issues which compromise a 
‘patent related case’” due to the court’s expertise). 
 250. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007). 
 251. Id. at 281. 
 252. See supra Section IV.C. 
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Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has eliminated a 
number of specialized antitrust rules and analytical carve-outs created 
for patents in favor of bringing patents into the general antitrust 
fold.253  The Court has largely accomplished this task by folding 
patent cases into the relatively unpredictable rule of reason.254  The 
rule of reason is a holistic test to determine whether certain conduct 
constitutes an illegal restraint of trade, eschewing clear standards in 
favor of flexibility and totality: 
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and 
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.255 
The trend towards an all-encompassing rule of reason approach to 
antitrust has produced costly,256 fact-intensive litigation with highly 
uncertain outcomes.257  As Professor Robin Feldman summarized, 
“[T]here is nothing messier than the rule of reason . . . [whose] 
                                                     
 253. See Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of 
Reason:  The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 62–63 
(2014) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis created an 
opportunity to structure the rule of reason in order to mitigate patent 
exceptionalism); Lee, supra note 122, at 1416. 
 254. Feldman, supra note 253, at 73–74; Shubha Ghosh, Convergence?, 15 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 95, 113 (2014) (“More engagement with the policies underlying 
competition would be desirable.  Instead, those thinking about antitrust engage with 
models of markets that may provide some guidance but lead invariably to the rule of 
reason.”); Lee, supra note 122, at 1445 (noting that the Supreme Court’s move 
toward the rule of reason is apparent in “tying arrangements and reverse patent 
settlements”). 
 255. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 256. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1984) 
(“Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere 
is that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason.”); 
Ghosh, supra note 254, at 102 (arguing that the “litigation costs” under the rule of reason 
are so high that it effectively “serve[s] to immunize patent owners from suit”). 
 257. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle, 
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 546 (2011) (“Full-blown rule-of-reason analysis 
subjects defendants to considerable expense and uncertainty.”); see also Andrew I. 
Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization:  The Modern Rule of Reason in 
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 n.28 (2012) (“The proposition that rule of reason 
litigation can be uncertain and costly . . . does not appear to be controversial.”). 
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analysis is so complex that it is a burden on litigants and the judicial 
system.”258  Perhaps ironically, some of the most strident criticism of 
the all-encompassing rule of reason has come from the Supreme 
Court itself.259  To the extent that bringing antitrust cases involving 
patents into the general, all-purpose rule of reason eliminates 
otherwise bright-line rules and presumptions, it inevitably generates 
uncertainty in its own right.260  More importantly for the purposes of 
this Article, the rule of reason forces antitrust courts in practice to 
analyze more and more patent law issues—analysis for which antitrust 
courts are ill-equipped.261 
For example, the existence of “market power”262 is a necessary 
predicate to certain antitrust violations, such as tying.263  In Illinois 
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,264 the Supreme Court 
eliminated the presumption that a patent confers “market power” 
over the products covered by the patent; in doing so, the Court 
                                                     
 258. Feldman, supra note 253, at 63. 
 259. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the “costs of a rule-of-reason approach” 
necessarily include “elaborate inquir[ies] into the economic effects of” the particular 
suspect conduct), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 
(2006); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (“[P]er se 
rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the 
burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason 
trials . . . .”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that rule of 
reason analysis requires “incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation 
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort 
to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry 
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken”); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 
U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (noting that rule of reason analysis frequently requires “minute 
inquiry [into] whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable”). 
 260. See David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards:  Competing Notions of 
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 664 (2013) (discussing how 
the loss of presumptions and bright-line rules governing patents removes 
“predictability” and “allows more inconsistency to persist in the system”). 
 261. But see Mark S. Levy, Comment, Big Pharma Monopoly:  Why Consumers Keep 
Landing on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 283–85 
(2016) (advocating for courts to apply the rule of reason in patent-related 
pharmaceutical cases, such as REMS manipulation and product hopping). 
 262. Market power is generally defined as “the ability to raise prices above those 
that would be charged in a competitive market.”  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 
85, 109 n.38 (1984). 
 263. See supra note 227 (defining “tying” and explaining its implications for 
consumers and commerce).  See generally WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST CASEBOOK:  
MILESTONES IN ECONOMIC REGULATION 218–20 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing examples of 
tying arrangements analyzed by the Court and outlining the doctrine’s evolution). 
 264. 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
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moved tying cases to a rule of reason analysis.265  Legal academics and 
economists had long criticized that presumption as inaccurate in 
many cases.266  But the marginal gain in accuracy267 has come at the 
loss of consistency and predictability268 and an increase in the need 
for antitrust courts to delve into patent interpretation.  The question 
of whether market power exists over a certain product forces courts 
to consider potential substitutes for that product;269 so when patents 
are involved, the courts must—at least implicitly—determine the 
precise scope of the patent:  What hypothetical substitute products or 
uses would not be infringing?270  This act of “translating the words of 
the [patent] into a meaningful technological context [is] one of the 
most difficult problems in patent law.”271  And yet, in these antitrust 
cases, it would be the inconsistent regional circuits, rather than the 
Federal Circuit, reviewing patent interpretations.272 
                                                     
 265. See id. at 31.  Before Illinois Tool Works, “requisite economic power [was] 
presumed when the tying product [was] patented.”  United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 
U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), 
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28. 
 266. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST:  AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW § 4.2(a) (Supp. 2005) (arguing that intellectual property rights grant power to 
exclude but do not necessarily confer market power); Burchfiel, supra note 221, at 
57, 77–79 (1991) (commenting that the presumption is anecdotal and not supported 
by facts); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 184, at 374. 
 267. See Dennis J. Abdelnour, Note, Illinois Tool Works:  Allocating the Burden of 
Proving Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 365, 380–84 
(2007) (discussing classes of patents that would rightfully have a presumption of 
market power). 
 268. See supra notes 254–60; see also David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in 
Patent Law Adjudication:  Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 423, 495 (2013) 
(arguing that patent law has an exceptional need for certainty and bright-line rules 
relative to other doctrines). 
 269. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37–38 n.7 (1984) 
(plurality opinion); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power 
in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 256–57 n.75 (1987). 
 270. In the case of a package license analyzed as a tying scheme, the court’s need 
to delve into patent analysis is doubled:  Which patent licenses are substitutes for 
other patent licenses?  The question surely cannot be answered without first 
interpreting the patents in the package, delving into claim construction, and then 
doing the same for the arguable substitute patents. 
 271. Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 215, 218 (2008). 
 272. Where the plaintiff brings a non-patent law cause of action, such as an 
antitrust tying claim, appellate jurisdiction is generally with the regional courts 
rather than the Federal Circuit even if patents are factually involved.  See Holmes 
Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 834 (2002). 
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In short, the Credit Suisse Court recognized the “risk that antitrust 
courts, with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert 
juries, will produce inconsistent results” in areas of law where 
significant expertise is required, such as patent law.273  This threat of 
inconsistency has only been heightened by the trend to eliminate 
specialized antitrust rules and analytical carve-outs for patents that 
might otherwise prevent nonexpert courts from having to deal with 
patent intricacies.  The end result is a high probability of conflicting 
guidance and requirements where patent law and antitrust law are 
simultaneously applicable, counseling in favor of preemption. 
E. The Potential for Forum-Shopping 
Finally, the Credit Suisse Court noted that if antitrust law and 
securities law are simultaneously applicable, there is a danger of 
“permitting plaintiffs to dress what is essentially a securities complaint 
in antitrust clothing,” thereby avoiding securities-specific 
procedures.274  Circumventing these specialized procedures, the 
Court argued, would further contribute to conflicting guidance and 
requirements.275  Patent law features not only specialized procedures 
but an entirely separate court of appeals.276  As discussed above, 
bringing patents into the general antitrust fold has the end result of 
requiring generalist courts to analyze patent issues.277  Because the 
issues in antitrust cases involving patents evade unified Federal 
Circuit review, the Credit Suisse Court would be highly concerned 
about potential conflict. 
Exacerbating the problem, this jurisdictional side-stepping can also 
happen in reverse:  litigants may avoid the otherwise controlling 
regional circuit by dressing up their antitrust claims with tacked-on 
patent claims, thereby ending up before the Federal Circuit on 
appeal.  Before 1998, this would not have been a problem because 
“the general jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit had been to apply 
its own substantive law to patent issues and the appropriate regional 
circuit law to non-patent issues,” including antitrust issues.278  But 
                                                     
 273. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281 (2007). 
 274. Id. at 284. 
 275. Id. at 281–82. 
 276. See supra notes 94–96. 
 277. See supra Section IV.D. 
 278. Claudette Espanol, Comment, The Federal Circuit:  Jurisdictional Expansion into 
Antitrust Issues Relating to Patent Enforcement, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 307, 315 (2005) 
(citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)).  For an example of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nobelpharma approach, see Atari, 
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over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has created its own 
body of antitrust law that is distinct and separate from the bodies of 
antitrust law for each of the regional circuits.279  This puts district 
courts in a considerable bind when antitrust and patent claims 
overlap:  Should they apply the Federal Circuit’s antitrust law or the 
law of their regional circuit?280  To the extent that different districts—
across different types of cases—vary in their answer to that 
question,281 the overlap between patent and antitrust law will 
continue to generate inconsistency and conflict. 
Taken together, these concerns paint a relatively bleak picture 
where patent law and antitrust law overlap.  The fine, precise 
doctrinal lines within patent law are likely to be warped.  Similar 
economic and competitive considerations—but not identical 
standards—make contradictory inferences inevitable.  Generalist 
courts are forced to adjudicate patent issues over which they lack the 
requisite expertise.  Across courts, results are virtually certain to be 
inconsistent—a phenomenon only made worse by the potential for 
forum-shopping.  In short, the risk that the patent and antitrust laws, 
“if both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, 
requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct” is at least as 
great as the risk associated with the securities-antitrust overlap.282  
Looking at the longstanding, fundamental tension between patent 
law and antitrust law—and the considerable ink spilled by academics 
                                                     
Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying the law of the 
“involved circuit” to all issues over which the Federal Circuit did not have exclusive 
jurisdiction), overruled by Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. 
 279. Espanol, supra note 278, at 318 (noting that the Federal Circuit applies its 
own body of antitrust law, not regional circuit precedent, to “antitrust claims 
premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit”). 
 280. See id. at 325 (“[T]here may be conflicting authority on the same issues, 
depending on where an appeal will be brought . . . .  A district court must adhere to 
Federal Circuit precedent in interpreting and applying patent law.  At the same time, 
a district court is also required to respect the authority of its regional circuit court 
when interpreting non-patent specific issues.”); James B. Kobak, Jr., The Federal Circuit 
as a Competition Law Court, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 527, 530–32 (2001). 
 281. For example, in Spotless Enterprises, Inc. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., the Eastern 
District of New York followed the Second Circuit, rather than the Federal Circuit, in 
holding that bad faith was not required as part of a patent-based unfair competition 
claim.  56 F. Supp. 2d 274, 286–87 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (explicitly rejecting Hunter 
Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).  Other 
districts instead followed the Federal Circuit’s holding that bad faith was required.  
See, e.g., Moore N. Am., Inc. v. Poser Bus. Forms, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-712-SLR, 2000 
WL 1480992, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2000). 
 282. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275–76 (2007). 
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and policymakers in unsuccessful attempts to resolve that tension—
the conclusion that the risk is in fact far greater becomes inescapable. 
V. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERPLAY 
The preemption arguments in Parts II, III, and IV proceeded by 
attempting to apply the Credit Suisse framework as narrowly as possible.  
While the analysis in Credit Suisse elevates what might be more 
appropriately termed policy arguments into doctrinal ones, the attempt 
thus far has been to resist introducing policy arguments that have no 
direct parallel or referent in Credit Suisse.  Having made the narrow case, 
this Part broadens the analysis, introducing additional arguments in 
favor of patent law preempting antitrust law for which Credit Suisse 
appears to at least pave the way, if not provide full endorsement. 
Specifically, the following subsections explore four arguments in 
favor of preemption relying on the unique interplay between patent 
law and antitrust law; arguments that were therefore necessarily 
absent from the securities-antitrust analysis of Credit Suisse.  First, 
patent terms provide a built-in time limit on any particular 
anticompetitive scheme.  Second, the anticompetitive effects of 
schemes requiring patentable innovation are offset, at least in part, by 
increased incentives to innovate.  Third, the patent-antitrust overlap 
threatens not only to distort patent doctrine, as explored in Part IV, 
but also antitrust doctrine.  Fourth, at least some anticompetitive 
problems in the patent sphere are themselves the result of antitrust 
intervention.  These four arguments support the notion that the 
benefits of antitrust intervention are particularly low—and the costs 
particularly high—where patents are concerned.  Consistent with the 
logic of Credit Suisse, these arguments offer additional support for 
strongly considering preemption. 
A. Patent Expiration and Unwinding Schemes 
The preemption analysis undertaken by the Credit Suisse Court, 
following on Trinko and NYNEX, was essentially based on cost-benefit 
analysis:  the costs of antitrust intervention are generally quite high,283 
and the existence of an alternative supervisory regime undercuts 
most potential benefits.284  In Credit Suisse, the supervision and tools 
of the SEC made the need for antitrust intervention “unusually small” 
in the securities context.285  In the patent context, there are similar 
                                                     
 283. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 19–35 and accompanying text. 
 285. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283. 
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alternative sources of supervision, as outlined in Part II.  But even 
where these sources are lacking, anticompetitive patent schemes—
unlike anticompetitive securities schemes—have a built-in expiration 
date that further reduces the benefits of antitrust intervention:  the 
end of the patent term. 
For applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the patent term is 
twenty years from filing,286 provided that maintenance fees are properly 
paid.287  Once the patent term expires, the patent is no longer 
enforceable, and competitors are free to practice its claims.288  
Therefore, even absent any supervision or intervention, most of the 
types of patent schemes analyzed in Part III will eventually self-destruct.  
Attempts to peg royalty rates to the sales of an unrelated product, for 
example, necessarily unwind when royalties are no longer due. 
This stands in stark comparison to most anticompetitive schemes, 
which gain strength as market power is consolidated over time and 
threaten to continue in perpetuity absent intervention.289  This threat 
of anticompetitive equilibrium is in part what justifies the costly 
application of antitrust law in the first place.290  Where an 
anticompetitive scheme is inherently unstable or short-lived, on the 
other hand, the benefits of antitrust intervention are minimized.291  As 
                                                     
 286. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)(2012). 
 287. Id. § 41(b)(1). 
 288. Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 289. A firm that uses predatory pricing to consolidate market share, for example, 
may then use its dominant position to capitalize on barriers to entry, such as 
economies of scale, network effects, or vertical integration, making its predation even 
harder to overcome.  See, e.g., ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS:  
PRINCIPLES IN ACTION 153 (2003); R. Preston McAfee et al., What Is a Barrier to Entry?, 
94 AM. ECON. REV. 461, 461 (2004). 
 290. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284. 
 291. Antitrust scholars have made an analogous point in the cartel context.  
Cartels, groups of competitors that all agree to charge some supracompetitive price, 
are considered inherently unstable.  Every member in the group has an incentive to 
charge less than the agreed-upon price and thereby capture the entire market as the 
cheapest seller.  See ADI AYAL, FAIRNESS IN ANTITRUST:  PROTECTING THE STRONG FROM 
THE WEAK 52 (2014) (“Since cheating is undeniably lucrative, a cartel is inherently 
unstable, and thus will defeat itself over time.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
67 (2d ed. 2001) (“[C]artel[s] [are] rife with inducements and temptations to 
cheating, as is confirmed by the history of actual cartels, which are usually quite 
unstable even when not forced underground by antitrust enforcement.”).  As a 
result, scholars argue, the benefits of antitrust intervention against cartels are 
minimal and do not generally justify the associated costs.  See, e.g., DOMINICK T. 
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST:  THE CASE FOR REPEAL 90 (2d ed. 1999); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 196 (1978). 
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a result, the cost-benefit analysis for antitrust intervention where 
patents are concerned leans even more heavily in favor of preemption. 
B. Monopolist Profits and Incentives to Innovate 
To return to the outset of this Article, antitrust law’s primary goal is 
to “proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition” and thereby 
ensure efficient competitive market operation.292  “[T]he core 
reason” that antitrust scholars oppose monopolies and price fixing is 
because of the associated “deadweight loss.”293  That is, the 
monopolist or price fixer does not merely transfer wealth out of the 
pockets of consumers into its own; it prevents otherwise mutually 
beneficial transactions from occurring, “injur[ing] both the excluded 
consumers and the economy more broadly as inefficient substitution 
takes place.”294  That deadweight loss effect, however, is minimized 
where anticompetitive patent behavior is at issue due to increased 
incentives to innovate. 
When patentable innovation occurs, the entire economy benefits.  
“[N]ew products and processes,” as well as “improvements in . . . 
productivity,” permit more mutually beneficial transactions to occur 
and grow the economy in a process essentially opposite that of 
deadweight loss.295  Incentives to innovate therefore affect economic 
growth.  The potential to enact an anticompetitive patent scheme 
may form such an incentive. 
Anticompetitive schemes are generally quite profitable, and a 
potential innovator deciding whether to invest additional time and 
money into research and development would take the possibility of 
such profits into account.  Even if an anticompetitive patent scheme 
causes some deadweight loss, the extent that the economy grows—
either directly by the patent used in the scheme or indirectly by 
increased incentives to innovate—may offset any deadweight losses in 
                                                     
 292. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 293. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST INJURY AND FIRM-SPECIFIC DAMAGES 45, 45 (Kevin S. Marshall 
ed., 2008). 
 294. Id.  For background information on the mechanics of deadweight loss, see 
generally N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 163–70 (2014). 
 295. ABBY JOSEPH COHEN, GOLDMAN SACHS, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 
(2012), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/gsr.pdf 
(connecting innovation to improved living standards).  See generally DAVID WARSH, 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS:  A STORY OF ECONOMIC DISCOVERY xv–xvii 
(2006); David Ahlstrom, Innovation and Growth:  How Business Contributes to Society, 24 
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 11, 11 (2010). 
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the long run.296  This is, of course, the same logic underpinning the 
patent system in the first place:  temporarily monopolistic practices 
are tolerated in exchange for incentivizing innovation.297 
Naturally, this line of reasoning has its limits.  The returns from 
incentivizing even the most groundbreaking innovation can 
eventually be swallowed by sufficiently egregious patent schemes.  
While a typical anticompetitive scheme does little more than line the 
pockets of the perpetrator, an anticompetitive scheme that first 
requires patentable innovation offers at least some returns to society 
as a whole.  And to the extent that patent-related anticompetitive 
schemes are more likely to provide at least some offsetting long-term 
economic benefits compared to non-patent schemes, the costs of 
antitrust intervention will be less justified on the margins where 
patents are involved. 
C. Doctrinal Distortions in Antitrust 
The analysis in Part IV examines the extent that conflicting 
guidance and requirements are likely to emerge if antitrust law and 
patent law are permitted to overlap.  That analysis focused primarily 
on the damage that overlap would do to patent law:  from disrupting 
the “fine, complex, detailed line[s]” of patent doctrines to 
improperly interpreting patents due to a lack of requisite 
“expertise.”298  But as antitrust law increasingly attempts to supervise 
patent activity, antitrust law itself is at risk of warping as well. 
For example, antitrust courts have attempted in recent years to 
police patent trolls:  entities that acquire and enforce patents without 
                                                     
 296. This is particularly likely to be true because the anticompetitive scheme 
eventually expires but the new technology will continue to be available in perpetuity.  
See supra notes 286–91 and accompanying text. 
 297. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Manual of Political Economy, in 1 JEREMY BENTHAM’S 
ECONOMIC WRITINGS 263 (Werner Stark ed., 1952) (“A patent considered as a 
recompense for the encrease [sic] given to the general stock of wealth by an invention, 
as a recompense for industry and genius and ingenuity, is proportionate and essentially 
just.  No other mode of recompense can merit either one of the other epithet.”); JOHN 
STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 932–33 (2d ed. 1929) (“[I]n general an 
exclusive privilege, of temporary duration is preferable; because it leaves nothing to any 
one’s discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends on the invention’s being 
found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is 
paid by the very persons to whom the service is rendered, the consumers of the 
commodity.”); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 712 (1937) (arguing that the 
provision of temporary monopoly is “the easiest and most natural way in which the state 
can [provide] recompense . . . for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of 
which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit”). 
 298. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279, 282 (2007). 
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actually practicing them.299  The troll business model—acquiring 
licensing fees from entities that actually do create goods and services—
has led many academics and policymakers to characterize them as a 
pure anticompetitive nuisance worthy of antitrust intervention.300  But 
there are “clear doctrinal . . . roadblocks to leveraging antitrust law” to 
police much of patent troll behavior, ranging from “quasi-
constitutional” protections to textual limitations.301 
In terms of constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has 
established that the First Amendment’s protection of the right to 
petition grants presumptive immunity from liability under the 
antitrust laws for “attempts to influence the passage or enforcement 
of laws,” such as patent infringement suits.302  This immunity applies 
even when a suit is brought with anticompetitive intent: 
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust 
laws even though intended to eliminate competition.  Such conduct is not 
illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself 
violative of the Sherman Act.  The jury should have been so 
instructed and, given the obviously telling nature of this evidence, 
we cannot hold this lapse to be mere harmless error.303 
                                                     
 299. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” 
DEBATE 4 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf. 
 300. See Carrier, supra note 125, at 11–12; Collin A. Rose, Note, A Match Made for 
Court:  Patent Assertion Entities and the Federal Trade Commission, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 95, 139 (2014); Bert Foer & Sandeep Vaheesan, Patent Trolls in the Cross Hairs, 
AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/pate 
nt-trolls-cross-hairs (arguing that the Department of Justice and the FTC should 
bypass Congress and take action pursuant to their existing authority); Gene Sperling, 
Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 
2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-
protect-american-innovation (arguing that patent trolls are responsible for “an 
explosion of abusive patent litigation designed not to reward innovation . . . but to 
threaten companies in order to extract settlements based on questionable claims”); 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 12 (2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 301. Sipe, supra note 8, at 191, 223. 
 302. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 
(1961).  For examples of the application of this immunity doctrine specifically to 
patent trolls, see In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 922 
(N.D. Ill. 2013); Steven Seidenberg, Patent Trolls Are Getting First Amendment Protection 
for Their Demand Letters, ABA J. (May 1, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent_trolls_are_getting_first_amen
dment_protection_for_demand_letters. 
 303. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) 
(emphasis added). 
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The only exception to this immunity is where a lawsuit is a “sham,” 
determined by a two-prong test:  (1) the suit “must be objectively 
baseless,” such that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits,” and (2) the suit must be brought with the 
“subjective motivation” to interfere with a competitor through 
“governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process.”304 
However, neither prong is likely to be met in many troll cases.  With 
regard to the first prong, the patent quality of troll portfolios is 
generally at least as high as portfolios owned by non-trolls,305 and 
patents owned by trolls tend to fare no better or worse on average in 
reexamination proceedings.306  With regards to the second prong, troll 
plaintiffs genuinely hope to succeed on the merits.  Trolls, by 
definition, do not participate in the actual product market—and 
hence are not in competition with the product sellers—so merely 
hurting producers through nuisance litigation does them no good.  A 
successful infringement suit, on the other hand, grants them damages.  
As a result, for antitrust law to reach patent trolls, arguably the most 
important carve-out from antitrust liability307 would need to be eroded. 
In terms of textual limitations, in the types of patent troll cases 
where immunity does not apply, commentators have frequently 
suggested using section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as the 
doctrinal hook for antitrust enforcement.308  The scope of section 5—
prohibiting any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
                                                     
 304. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
60–61 (1993). 
 305. See Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology—An 
Empirical Analysis of NPEs’ Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL’Y 1519, 1519 (2012); see also 
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458, 481 (2012). 
 306. See Steve Moore, A Fractured Fairytale Part 3:  More Patent Troll Myths, IP 
WATCHDOG (July 31, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/31/a-factured-
fairytale-part-3-more-patent-troll-myths/id=43755. 
 307. See, e.g., M. Sean Royall & Seth M.M. Stodder, From Burlington Northern to 
Baltimore Scrap, 15 ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 47, 51 (2001) (“There is a clear 
public interest in ensuring that meritorious claims are brought before the courts, 
irrespective of the subjective motivations of the claimants or their supporters . . . 
many important cases concerning vital public interests . . . might [otherwise] never 
be brought into court and resolved.”). 
 308. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering:  Patents as 
Weapons, U. CIN. L. REV. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://uclawreview.org/2015/02/19/patent 
-privateering-patents-as-weapons (explaining the absence of a legal claim against the 
mere existence of a patent troll); Carrier, supra note 125, at 11–12 (suggesting section 5 
as a vehicle for the FTC to address patent trolling); Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 145, 
at 12; Comments of Google et al., supra note 150, at 3–4; Comments of Philip Malone, 
Patent Assertion Entities Activities Workshop, supra note 149, at 156, 162. 
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commerce”309—is quite broad.  This breadth makes it a seemingly 
natural tool against a novel threat like patent trolls, who do not appear 
to implicate other antitrust laws.310  But the use of section 5 as a catch-
all to expand antitrust law’s reach has significant drawbacks.  Critics 
rightly point out the “apparent absence of limiting principles” in both 
section 5’s language311 and interpretation,312 and the commensurate 
risk of uncertainty and rent-seeking generated by its application in 
novel contexts.313  Attempts to police patent trolls only exacerbate this 
increasingly atextual approach to antitrust enforcement. 
Hence, if antitrust law is to play a role in policing patent troll 
activity, it would first have to “distort” antitrust law in order to do 
so,314 whether by overriding key doctrinal carve-outs or by permitting 
atextual expansion.  Either way, the existing risk of false antitrust 
positives and chilling effects associated with antitrust intervention is 
increased significantly.  In comparison, patent law may already have 
the tools to curtail troll behavior.315  Where, as in the context of 
patent trolls, antitrust law must be stretched or distorted in order to 
reach patent activity, the benefits of preemption as an alternative are 
therefore substantial. 
D. Antitrust Solutions Causing Antitrust Problems 
Paradoxically, antitrust involvement in the patent sphere itself 
occasionally generates anticompetitive problems.  A key example of 
                                                     
 309. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 310. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 8, at 191, 194 (examining some of the shortcomings 
of applying the Sherman Act to troll activity). 
 311. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 942 (2010). 
 312. James Cooper, The Limits of Section 5’s Scope Beyond the Sherman Act, TRUTH ON 
THE MARKET (Aug. 1, 2013), http://truthonthemarket.com/tag/sherman-act/ 
(asserting that FTC Commissioners essentially define illegal action under section 5).  
But see Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, FTC (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu 
ments/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf (outlining broad 
principles “intended to provide a framework” for the exercise of section 5 authority, 
such as “the promotion of consumer welfare”). 
 313. James Campbell Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion:  The Elusive Meaning 
of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 87, 91, 117–18 
(2015); Joshua D. Wright, Revisiting Antitrust Institutions:  The Case for Guidelines to 
Recalibrate the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5 Unfair Methods of Competition Authority, 
2013 CONCURRENCES, at 1, 2 (articulating the concern that a lack of continuity in FTC 
Commissioners will result in inconsistent agency action). 
 314. Sipe, supra note 8, at 203. 
 315. See supra Part III. 
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this occurrence comes from the standard-setting context.  As noted in 
Section III.A, SSOs are concerned with the potential for a patent 
owner to charge an exorbitant royalty rate after its technology has 
been incorporated into a standard and implementers are thereby 
effectively “locked-in.”316  As a result, before incorporating a known 
patented technology into a standard, SSOs will frequently require 
patent owners to agree in advance to license its technology on certain 
favorable terms.317 
However, SSOs are constrained in their ability to engage in such ex 
ante negotiations due to antitrust interference.  An SSO requiring all 
standard-implicating patent owners to license at a given rate may be 
characterized as a price-fixing cartel—a serious Sherman Act 
violation.318  As a result, SSOs use “licensing obligations [that] are left 
intentionally vague to avert price-fixing liability.”319  Typically, these 
obligations take the form of nebulous “FRAND” terms:  the patentee 
is asked to agree to license on “fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory terms.”320 
This intentional ambiguity unfortunately comes at the cost of 
enforceability: 
Despite the appeal of FRAND commitments, a consistent, practical, 
and readily enforceable definition of FRAND has proven difficult to 
achieve.  Virtually no [SSO] defines what this elusive phrase means, 
and many [SSOs] affirmatively disclaim any role in establishing, 
interpreting, or adjudicating the reasonableness of FRAND licensing 
terms.  In fact, some [SSOs] go so far as to prohibit discussions of 
                                                     
 316. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
 318. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for 
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745, 753 (1999) (“The Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice has even taken action against the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute for compelling members to relinquish 
[infringement claims] in the standards it promulgates.”); Patrick D. Curran, 
Comment, Standard-Setting Organizations:  Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 983, 1000–01 (2003) (arguing that an SSO should be concerned about 
the possibility of being found liable under several antitrust theories); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.1, at 24 (1995) (“[H]orizontal restraints [arising from 
joint patent ventures] often will be evaluated under the rule of reason.  In some 
circumstances, however, that analysis may be truncated . . . some restraints may merit 
per se treatment, including price fixing . . . .”). 
 319. Curran, supra note 318, at 983. 
 320. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 141, at 671 (expressing concern that FRAND 
requirements are not sufficiently established). 
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royalties and other licensing terms at [SSO] meetings, making the 
development of any consensus view unlikely.321 
As a result, there has been considerable litigation between 
patentees and SSOs over the meaning of their FRAND obligations—
leaving courts to the thankless task of determining, for example, what 
a “reasonable” price for a given patent license is.322  Scholars and 
policymakers have already proposed antitrust intervention as a 
solution to these attempts to “exploit the ambiguities” of FRAND 
commitments.323  But these proposals consistently fail to observe the 
role that antitrust played in creating and perpetuating these 
ambiguities in the first place. 
In other words, antitrust law has created an anticompetitive 
problem in the patent sphere, and the existence of that 
anticompetitive problem is now being used as a justification for 
greater antitrust intervention.  In cases such as this, preemption 
offers an out.  Antitrust intervention, on the other hand, merely 
ensures its own necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court precedent suggests that preemption may offer an 
elegant resolution to the escalating tension between patent law and 
antitrust law.  The PTO, the ITC, and the Federal Circuit already 
exercise considerable regulatory authority over the patent sphere—in 
particular over patent schemes involving licensing leverage or 
informational asymmetry.  Permitting antitrust law to overlap with 
this patent authority is likely to do more harm than good due to the 
complex doctrinal lines governing patent conduct, the contradictory 
inferences that patent law and antitrust law necessitate, the high 
degree of expertise necessary to adjudicate patent issues, and the 
considerable risk of forum-shopping.  The Supreme Court has 
already found this combination—alternative supervision and risk of 
conflict—sufficiently compelling to preempt antitrust law in the 
                                                     
 321. Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND:  A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based 
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 51–52 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
 322. Id. at 95–97 (indexing the major FRAND disputes from 1995–2012). 
 323. Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust 
Div., Remarks for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs 
Before Lunch 11 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download; 
George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in 
Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2011); Christopher B. Hockett & Rosanna G. 
Lipscomb, Best FRANDs Forever?  Standard-Setting Antitrust Enforcement in the United 
States and the European Union, 23 ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 19, 19–22. 
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securities sphere.  But the case for patent law preempting antitrust 
law is even stronger due to the unique nature of patents and the 
interplay—and tension—that patent law alone has with antitrust law.  
The inherent time limit on anticompetitive patent schemes, the 
economic effects of increased incentives to innovate, the risks of 
warping antitrust doctrine to cover patent activity, and the self-
defeating effects that antitrust intervention has had thus far all 
suggest that where patents are concerned, the benefits of antitrust 
intervention are even lower—and the costs much higher. 
